The Constitution and the Language of the Law by McGinnis, John O. & Rappaport, Michael B.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 4 Article 4
The Constitution and the Language of the Law
John O. McGinnis
Michael B. Rappaport
Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 1321 (2018), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol59/iss4/4
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
JOHN O. MCGINNIS* & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT**
ABSTRACT
A long-standing debate exists over whether the Constitution is
written in ordinary or legal language. Yet no article has offered a
framework for determining the nature of the Constitution’s language,
let alone systematically canvassed the evidence.
This Article fills the gap. First, it shows that a distinctive legal
language exists. This language in the Constitution includes terms,
like “Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” that are unambiguously
technical, and terms, like “good behavior,” that are ambiguous in
that they have both an ordinary and legal meaning but are better
interpreted according to the latter. It also includes legal interpretive
rules such as those that tell readers whether a term should be given
its legal meaning or its ordinary meaning.
The Article explains how to determine whether a document is
written in the language of the law. Unsurprisingly, the most impor-
tant factor is the language of the document itself. The pervasive
presence of technical legal terms provides strong evidence that a
document is written in the language of the law because ordinary
language cannot easily account for even a small number of legal
terms. The purpose of the document also counts. Insofar as it is
written to inform officials of their duties, a document is more likely
to be written in legal language because that language allows more
precision. The language of similar documents provides additional
evidence. That other constitutions at the time were written in the
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language of the law militates in favor of reading the Constitution in
that same language.
The Article supplies strong evidence that the Constitution is
written in the language of the law. The Article is the first to count the
legal terms in the Constitution and approximates them at one
hundred. Moreover, the Constitution’s text assumes the application
of legal interpretive rules, both blocking the operation of certain legal
interpretive rules and calling for the application of others. Finally,
the judges and legislators charged with implementing the Constitu-
tion in the early Republic frequently deployed legal interpretive rules
to resolve contested issues.
The Constitution’s legal language has important theoretical and
practical significance. Theoretically, it suggests that original-meth-
ods originalism is the correct form of originalism, because the Consti-
tution’s legal interpretive rules are crucial to accurately determine its
meaning. Practically, the richness of the idiom of the language of the
law provides resources to address otherwise unresolvable interpretive
questions. As a result, much of modern originalist scholarship about
specific provisions depends for its force on reading the Constitution
in the language of the law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution has launched hundreds of debates about its
meaning. But before these disputes can be settled, an underlying
clash of visions about the nature of its very language requires reso-
lution. One view holds that the Constitution is written in ordinary
language and is thus fully accessible to anyone with knowledge of
the English language. Another view is that the Constitution is
written, like many other documents with legal force, in the language
of the law. Understanding its full meaning, then, requires legal as
well as ordinary linguistic knowledge. While the ordinary-language
view is often assumed,1 the entire question has received little
serious treatment. In this Article, the first devoted to the subject, we
show that the Constitution was written in the language of the law.
Resolving this dispute is important for any interpretive theory
that gives at least some weight to the Constitution’s original
meaning, which includes almost all of them.2 But it is particularly
important to originalism. Originalism posits that the meaning of the
Constitution was fixed at the time of its enactment.3 And that
meaning was fixed by the Constitution’s language.4 Thus, the lan-
guage in which the Constitution was written can make a fundamen-
tal difference to its interpretation.
The ordinary-language view understands the Constitution as
written in standard, everyday English. Under this view, when the
Constitution addresses fundamental political norms, it uses lan-
1. The Supreme Court has on occasion made this assumption. See, e.g., United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931). It is also prevalent in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Ian
Bartrum, Two Dogmas of Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 157, 181 (2015) (criticizing
originalism but agreeing with the assumption); Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists
Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 1, 2-3 (2011) (suggesting that the importance of ordinary language is a tenet of the
so-called new originalism).
2. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997) (“[V]irtually all practi-
tioners of and commentators on constitutional law accept that original meaning has some
relevance to constitutional interpretation.”).
3. See Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Origin-
alist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE-
TATION 12, 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
4. See, e.g., id.
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guage much as nonlegal documents, like newspapers at the time,
used language. To be sure, sophisticated people may understand the
implications of the document better than the less sophisticated, but
no legal expertise is needed. Thus, in its purest form, this view
suggests that all the Constitution’s terms are terms in ordinary
language.
Under the ordinary-language view, the Constitution is explicated
based on ordinary interpretive rules. These rules guide interpreta-
tion of statements made in ordinary language.5 For example, it is
normally thought that a speaker or writer will not contradict him-
self in a document. Thus, interpreters try to understand different
provisions as consistent.
But the ordinary-language view faces challenges. One issue for
this view is how to interpret terms, like “Letters of Marque and
Reprisal,”6 that have no meaning outside of the law and are there-
fore unfamiliar to the ordinary language reader. A second issue is
how to understand terms like “due process,”7 that have both a legal
meaning and an ordinary meaning. Yet another issue is how to
address provisions, like the Supremacy Clause,8 whose words invoke
preexisting legal interpretive rules.9 These are challenges because
the ordinary-language view cannot easily account for meanings that
are not part of ordinary language.
 Understanding the Constitution as written in the language of the
law dissolves these problems. Contrary to the ordinary-language
view, the language-of-the-law view posits that the Constitution is
written in the distinctive idiom of law. Like any technical language,
the language of the law overlays ordinary language; it uses English
as a foundation on which to build rather than creating a wholly new
language.
A document written in the language of the law thus contains both
ordinary language and legal language. Terms that have only legal
meanings, like letter of Marque and Reprisal, are given their legal
meaning. Terms that have only ordinary meanings are given their
5. See infra Part I.A.2.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
7. Id. amend. V.
8. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
9. See infra Part III.D.1.
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ordinary meanings. And terms like due process, that have both an
ordinary and a legal meaning, are treated as ambiguous. Under the
language of the law, these terms have the meaning that the context
and other interpretive rules indicate they have.
The language-of-the-law view also differs from the ordinary-
language view in embracing legal interpretive rules. Law has over
time generated distinctive rules that guide interpretation of docu-
ments written in its language. For example, the rule of lenity, which
requires criminal prohibitions to be interpreted in favor of the
criminal defendant, has regularly been applied to legal enactments,
even though it does not apply in ordinary language.10
Through technical meanings and distinctive rules of interpreta-
tion, the language of the law can affix a more precise meaning to
constitutional provisions than ordinary language can. For example,
one legal meaning of due process is conformity with the legal pro-
cedures employed at common law.11 That meaning is more precise
than the ordinary language understanding of the term as fair
procedures.
Reading the Constitution in the language of the law makes a
substantial difference to originalism. Most importantly, if the Con-
stitution is written in the language of the law, only reading it in
that language will yield an accurate interpretation. For instance, if
the right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment is
defined by the meaning of confrontation at common law, then the
right will only receive that meaning if the Constitution is read in
the language of the law. Similarly, if an “unreasonable” search or
seizure under the Fourth Amendment meant a search or seizure
prohibited by the common law, then only the language of the law
will yield that meaning.
Moreover, the language of the law often provides a more precise
answer when ordinary language would not provide a clear one. The
ordinary meaning of the right to confront witnesses does not deter-
mine when the right is forfeited, but the legal meaning does.12 The
10. See NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.3 (6th ed., 2001
rev., 2001).
11. For discussion of the common law interpretation of the Due Process Clause, see infra
notes 450-54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
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ordinary meaning of the word “unreasonable” in the Fourth Amend-
ment13 appears ambiguous, but a precise legal meaning may be
determined by the common law of the time.14 Similarly, “due process
of law”15 seems vague in ordinary language, but legal scholars have
used legal language to find a determinate meaning.16 Indeed, much
of the best modern originalist scholarship is inconsistent with an
ordinary language reading of the Constitution.
Like most benefits, the language of the law’s capacity for
precision is not a free good. It is purchased at the cost of complete
transparency to the ordinary reader. At times, it also requires the
additional cost of employing lawyers. In many circumstances, those
costs are worth paying as a normative matter. Indeed, the entire
edifice of law is based on the proposition that, in the complex and
important enterprises of life, greater precision is worth the cost of
deploying a technical language fully familiar only to experts. But in
this Article we limit ourselves to proving an important, nonnorma-
tive, interpretive claim that resolves the conflict of views about the
nature of the Constitution’s language: the constitutional text is far
better understood as written in the language of the law than in
ordinary language.
Several pieces of evidence strongly support the conclusion that
the Constitution is written in the language of the law. First, the
Constitution refers to itself as law,17 which suggests that it is
written in the language in which laws are ordinarily written.
Second, we show that the language of the Constitution is filled with
numerous legal terms. Some of these terms are unambiguously
legal. Others are ambiguous, having both an ordinary and legal
meaning. And still others are possibly ambiguous—they have an
ordinary meaning but they may also, depending upon the fruits of
further historical research, turn out to have a legal meaning.
Moreover, many of these different types of terms are used more than
once in the Constitution, which reinforces the legal character of the
document. While it is not entirely clear how many terms are used
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. For discussion, see infra notes 455-59 and accompanying text.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. For discussion see infra notes 450-54 and accompanying text.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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with their legal meanings in the Constitution, it is a large num-
ber—likely more than one hundred. This Article is the first to
provide a way of cataloging and categorizing these legal terms.
Third, the Constitution uses various phrases tied to legal
interpretive rules. For example, it employs preambles and prefatory
clauses that were used mainly, and perhaps only, in legal docu-
ments.18 The interpretation of these phrases was governed by legal
interpretive rules. Similarly, the Constitution also employs lan-
guage that assumed the relevance of legal interpretive rules. For
example, the Supremacy Clause19 uses language (known as a non-
obstante clause) that was employed as a term of art to invoke a legal
interpretive rule that negated the application of another legal inter-
pretive rule.20 This language, then, shows that the document was
written with legal interpretive rules in mind.
Early interpreters of the Constitution also interpreted it as a
document written in the language of the law. The early Supreme
Court, both the pre-Marshall Court and the Marshall Court,
interpreted provisions to have legal meanings and applied legal
interpretive rules.21 In addition, legal meanings and legal interpre-
tive rules were applied during the Philadelphia and ratification
conventions. For example, the Philadelphia Convention was unsure
whether a prohibition on ex post facto laws applied only to criminal
law or also to civil ones.22 The delegates resolved the question by
consulting the leading legal treatise of the day, Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries.23 Early interpreters in the Congress also employed legal
meanings and legal interpretive rules.24
Finally, early interpreters also found legal meanings in state
constitutions and applied the legal interpretive rules to these
documents.25 If state constitutions were understood to be written in
the language of the law, that makes it more likely that a document
of the same type at the federal level used that language as well.
18. See infra Part III.D.2.
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
20. See infra Part III.D.1.
21. See infra Parts III.E.2-3.
22. For a full discussion, see infra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 361 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part III.F.2.
25. See infra Part III.E.1.
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Overall, then, evidence from the constitutional text and from early
interpretations of constitutions powerfully indicates that the United
States Constitution is written in the language of the law.
In Part I of our Article we show that a distinctive legal idiom
exists. The case for a language of the law can be made under either
a broad or narrow understanding of language. The broad conception
of language reflects the view that language includes word meanings
and any rules that speakers use to understand speech. These rules
include not only grammatical rules but also any rules that tell
speakers how to interpret the language. The commonsense argu-
ment for the broad conception is that language should include all
the background rules that help decode the communication of a
speaker or writer.
On this broad understanding, the language of the law is a dis-
tinctive technical language. It contains numerous words not part of
ordinary English and is governed by interpretive rules inapplicable
to ordinary language. Of course the language of the law is not
wholly independent of ordinary language, but, like other technical
languages, such as the language of medicine or psychology, is an
overlay on ordinary language.
The language of the law is a central part of a legal education.
Lawyers spend much of their education learning how to speak,
write, and interpret legal language. Like other languages, technical
and ordinary, the language of the law evolved over years to reflect
the needs of those who use it. These needs include not only special
technical terms to cover concepts not part of everyday use, but also
legal interpretive rules to make language more precise than in
everyday use.
Some scholars, however, take a narrower view of the content of
language, limiting it to word meanings (semantics) and grammatical
rules (syntax).26 But, even under this narrower conception, the
language of the law is a distinctive language. The technical vocab-
ulary, of course, qualifies straightforwardly as semantics. But under
this narrower view, language alone is insufficient to understand
utterances: context is also needed. For instance, in ordinary lan-
guage, to determine whether the word “diamond” refers to a gem or
26. See infra Part I.B.
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a ballfield, context indicates whether the conversation concerns
jewelry or baseball. While the context is not technically part of the
language, it is an essential ingredient for understanding an
utterance.
Under the narrower view, legal interpretive rules are inextricably
bound to the language of the law, because a legal document has a
legal context that envelops it. And that context can be as important
as language when interpreting what is said. It should not be sur-
prising that the context of the language of the law is in some ways
more rich and complicated than the contexts with which we
interpret ordinary language. It has been built over centuries to try
to make legal utterances more precise than utterances in the
everyday world.
Having made the case for the existence of a distinctive language
of the law, we then discuss in Part II the criteria by which one
should assess whether a document is written in the language of the
law. A variety of factors make it more likely that a document is
written in that language. Most importantly, the pervasive presence
of technical legal terms is overwhelming evidence that a document
is written in the language of the law, because ordinary language
cannot easily account for even a small number of legal terms. By
contrast, the existence of ordinary language terms in a legal docu-
ment does not militate against a finding that the document is
written in the language of the law, because that language encom-
passes ordinary language as well.
The purpose of the document is also relevant. If one of the
purposes of the Constitution was to articulate the fundamental law
so that it could be implemented by government officials,27 then this
purpose suggests that the language of the law was employed,
because that language allows for more precision. The authors and
audience of the document are also relevant. If the authors and
audience did not know the language of the law, this would suggest
that that language was not employed. But in the case of the
Constitution, the elites who authored the Constitution at Philadel-
phia were well acquainted with the language of the law.28 To be
sure, some members of the audience knew the language of the law
27. See infra Part II.A.3. 
28. See infra Part II.A.4.
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and others did not.29 But no strong inference can be drawn against
the language of the law because the public had a general under-
standing of the document and had access to more precise statements
from public debates among lawyers.
In Part III we review the overwhelming evidence described above
from the language of the Constitution and its early interpretation
showing that it is written in the language of the law.
It is true that the Constitution is written in the name of the
people.30 But it does not follow that it must be written in ordinary
language. Many legal documents, like wills and contracts, are writ-
ten in the name of ordinary people, even though they are written by
lawyers in the language of the law.
We end in Part IV with a discussion of originalist scholarship and
Supreme Court jurisprudence that relies on the language of the law.
Much of the best originalist scholarship today and leading original-
ist Supreme Court cases are simply inconsistent with an ordinary-
language view, because these works depend on conclusions and
inferences that cannot be derived from ordinary language.
I. THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
It makes both a theoretical and a practical difference whether the
Constitution is written in the language of the law or ordinary
language. The most obvious theoretical difference it makes is to the
theory of originalism. While originalism is a family of theories, all
versions of originalism share the view that meaning is fixed at the
time the Constitution was enacted.31 If originalism is defined by the
Constitution’s public meaning, the language of the document
determines that meaning. If originalism is defined by the intent of
the Constitution’s enactors, its meaning is indicated by the language
in which the enactors make their intent known. In both cases, if a
document is written in the language of the law, that language will
make a difference in its meaning.
29. See infra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
30. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
31. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453, 459, 528 (2013).
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The language in which the Constitution is written also has
theoretical implications for nonoriginalist approaches that take into
account the Constitution’s original meaning. For example, various
pluralistic approaches to constitutional interpretation consider the
Constitution’s original meaning as well as other factors, such as pre-
cedent, ethics, or prudence.32 To the extent that the original mean-
ing is part of the analysis, our argument may change the results of
those approaches as well.
The language in which the Constitution is written also has
practical implications for the interpretation of particular clauses.
First, as we describe below, it suggests that in some circumstances
a technical legal term be given its technical legal meaning, even if
the term has an ordinary meaning as well. “Due process” has al-
ready been mentioned as an example.33 “Unusual” in the prohibition
against “cruel and unusual punishments” is another34: “unusual”
can be interpreted as a technical legal term meaning practices that
are against “immemorial usage.”35
Second, as we also describe below, the language of the law con-
tains interpretive rules as an integral part of its meaning. For
example, one interpretive rule at the time of founding was the rule
of lenity, which provides that criminal prohibitions should be
construed in favor of the criminal defendant.36 If the rule is deemed
applicable to the Constitution, the original meaning would require
that the rule be employed. The Constitution provides that treason
“shall consist only in levying War against [the United States], or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”37
Assuming the rule applies to the Constitution, if an interpreter does
not interpret this language in favor of a criminal defendant, then he
would diverge from the Constitution’s actual meaning. Indeed, if the
Constitution’s authors expected that the rule of lenity would not be
32. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) (describing such
different modalities of constitutional interpretation).
33. See supra notes 12, 15-16 and accompanying text.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
35. See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2008).
36. See SINGER, supra note 10, § 59.3.
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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applied, they may have written the language of the Treason Clause
differently.
Another applicable interpretive rule provides that terms should
in some circumstances be given the meaning that they had at com-
mon law. The Sixth Amendment states that “the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”38 If an
interpreter were to ignore the common law meaning of this confron-
tation right, then once again he might be departing from the origin-
al meaning.39
We make our argument that the Constitution is written in the
language of the law in three principal Parts. This Part explores the
nature of the language of the law. We first offer a broader concep-
tion of the language of the law and then a narrower conception. In
Part II, we explore how to determine whether a document, such as
the Constitution, is written in the language of the law. In Part III,
we present empirical evidence, from the constitutional language
itself and the understandings of the people at the time, that the
Constitution was written in this language.
A. The Broad Conception of the Language of the Law
In exploring the nature of the language of the law, we consider
two different conceptions of that language—a narrow conception
and a broad conception.40 Under the narrow conception, language is
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-51 (2004) (explaining the common law
that informed the Confrontation Clause, and concluding that “[t]he Sixth Amendment must
be interpreted with this focus in mind”); see also Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical
Language?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501, 509-10, 510 n.42 (2015).
40. We are not the first to argue that documents may be written in language distinctive
to law. This notion goes back to such luminaries as Francis Bacon, Edward Coke, and William
Blackstone. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 290 (1963). In modern times,
H.L.A. Hart argued that all language used in law presupposes a legal system and is thus
distinctively legal. See H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV.
37, 37 (1954). In contrast, Charles Caton argued that the idiom of law is limited to technical
terms. See Charles E. Caton, Introduction to PHILOSOPHY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE vii-viii
(Charles E. Caton ed., 1963).
Our view differs from both Hart and Caton. Unlike Hart, we believe that some of the lan-
guage of the law is ordinary language whose meaning is readily accessible to ordinary readers.
Unlike Caton, we believe that legal language is not exhausted by technical terms, but includes
legal interpretive rules. Indeed, these rules are essential to determining which terms are legal
because some terms have both technical and ordinary meanings.
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understood to include only semantics (word meanings) and syntax
(grammar rules).41 Under the broad conception, language is under-
stood to include all rules that the author and audience follow in
using language.42 In addition to semantics and syntax, the broad
conception includes other rules that govern language. In the case of
the language of the law, those rules include the legal interpretive
rules that tell speakers how to interpret the language.
There are good reasons for exploring each of these conceptions.
The broad conception captures the regularities of how the language
of the law is actually employed. It includes all rules that govern how
speakers of this language communicate. Moreover, lawyers tend to
understand these rules as part of the language that they speak—as
part of thinking and speaking like a lawyer.
It also makes sense to explore the narrow conception, because it
follows a common view that language is limited to rules of semantics
and syntax. Under this view, the message communicated through
language depends not only on the language itself, but also on the
context (including the norms governing how words should be
understood). Under the narrow conception, the legal interpretive
rules are not part of the language, but are instead part of the
context of utterances made in the language of the law. As part of
that enduring context, these rules still need to be followed to de-
termine the meaning communicated by utterances in the language
of the law.
Ultimately, legal interpretive rules are essential to determining
the meaning of statements under both the broad and narrow
conceptions of the language of the law. While the result is the same
under the two conceptions, considering both these conceptions helps
enrich our understanding of an essential element of the way that
lawyers communicate.
More importantly, this Article is the first to provide systematic evidence that the Consti-
tution is written in the language of the law and show that this language has important
implications for constitutional interpretation. The closest recent work to ours is Schauer,
supra note 39, at 501-02. But Schauer ultimately took no position on how much of law is a
technical language. See id. at 502-03, 513.
41. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA.
L. REV. 1111, 1126 (2015). For discussion of the narrow conception, see infra Part I.B.
42. For discussion of the broad conception, see infra Part I.A.
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We begin this Section by examining the broader conception of the
language of the law, which includes not only words with legal mean-
ings, but also legal interpretive rules. After exploring that under-
standing of language, we consider the narrower conception of lan-
guage, which treats the legal interpretive rules as context for the
language.
1. Existence of the Language of the Law
It is clear that a language of the law exists—one that is employed
by lawyers and others who are learned in the law.43 A significant
part of learning the law involves learning to speak, write, and inter-
pret texts like a lawyer.44 These tasks involve learning a distinctive
legal language.45 That language contains many technical legal
terms.46 It also contains numerous legal interpretive rules that indi-
cate how language is to be interpreted and how its meaning is to be
determined.47
The notion of a technical language is accepted in philosophy of
language scholarship.48 The language of the law is a technical
language, like those of science or medicine.49 Technical languages
overlay an ordinary language.50 They are not entirely separate, but
43. See JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL
THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 6-7 (1973).
44. See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, MAKING THE CASE: THE ART OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION x-xi
(2016).
45. See J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: The View from Within,
61 MERCER L. REV. 705, 710 (2009).
46. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 39, at 501-02.
47. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Caton, supra note 40, at vii; David Langslow, Latin Technical Language:
Synonyms and Greek Words in Latin Medical Terminology, 87 TRANSACTIONS PHILOLOGICAL
SOC’Y 33, 34-35 (1989).
49. See, e.g., Veda R. Charrow, Jo Ann Crandall & Robert P. Charrow, Characteristics and
Functions of Legal Language, in SUBLANGUAGE: STUDIES OF LANGUAGE IN RESTRICTED SEMAN-
TIC DOMAINS 175, 175 (Richard Kittredge & John Lehrberger eds., 1982); Mario Jori, Legal
Pragmatics, in PRAGMATICS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 33, 34 (Alessandro
Capone & Francesca Poggi eds., 2016); Christopher Williams, Legal English and Plain
English: An Introduction, in 1 ESP ACROSS CULTURES 111, 118 (2004).
50. See Caton, supra note 40, at vii-ix.
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use ordinary language and lie on top of it.51 They are found when
specialized and accurate signification is required.
An important feature of a technical language is a vocabulary
peculiar to the language.52 Psychology, philosophy, and medicine, for
instance, all have a technical language that includes terms that
describe their particular perspective.53 No one doubts, for instance,
that “defense mechanism” has a specific meaning in psychology that
is separate from the conjunction of “defense” and “mechanism” in
ordinary language.54 Law also has a peculiar vocabulary.55 And it
not only has its own words, but also employs ordinary words, like
“property,” in a technical sense.56
As with other ordinary and technical languages, the lawyers who
know this language often use it unselfconsciously. When another
lawyer uses technical legal terms, they respond using other tech-
nical terms.57 When they read a legal document, they naturally em-
ploy legal interpretive rules.58 And when they draft a legal document,
51. See Langslow, supra note 48, at 34-35; see also Francesca Schironi, Technical
Languages: Science and Medicine, in A COMPANION TO THE ANCIENT GREEK LANGUAGE 338,
342-44 (Egbert J. Bakker ed., 2010).
52. See, e.g., PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 108 (1999); Yon Maley, The Language
of the Law, in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 11, 22 (John Gibbons ed., 1994); see also MELLINKOFF,
supra note 40, at 16-17 (discussing terms of art and identifying words and phrases of art law-
yers commonly use).
53. See, e.g., George T. Hole, Philosophical Counseling and Technical Language, 1 PHIL.
PRAC. 33, 33-34 (2005).
54. See id. at 33.
55. See Schauer, supra note 39, at 501-02 (noting that some legal terms “have no ordinary
uses”); see also MELLINKOFF, supra note 40, at 17.
56. See Jori, supra note 49, at 35. Many scholars have seen the language of the law as
even more pervasively technical, with all words to be read in light of the goals of a legal
system, goals that are sometimes manifested in their legal interpretive rules. See Schauer,
supra note 39, at 508-09. Thus, for instance, legal interpretive rules that encourage a statute
to be read in terms of its purpose would show that “what counted as a vehicle in ordinary
language might still not be a vehicle when understood as part of a legal rule.” See id. at 507
(citing Lon L. Fuller, Response, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart,
71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 633 (1958)). On this view, legal interpretive rules are a distinctive
feature of the language of the law as well because they change the meaning of words found
in a legal context from what they would signify in ordinary language. While we agree that the
legal texts have pervasively legal language, we do not necessarily agree with how these
scholars regard the language of the law or determine legal meaning. In any event, as we will
show, the Constitution in particular is full of distinctive legal words and references legal
interpretive rules.
57. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 267 n.221 (2010).
58. Cf. supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (explaining, for example, how the rule
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such as a statute, a regulation, or contract, they naturally use the
language of the law.59
It is not surprising that the language of the law would differ
significantly from ordinary language. The needs of lawyers differ
from those of ordinary speakers, because lawyers must often com-
municate ideas with precision.60 Lawyers also aim for concision,61
because the instruments they create must cover many different
situations without being overly prolix. Lawyers thus take advantage
of the specialized vocabulary and interpretive rules of the law,
which allow them to convey ideas in a richer and more precise way.62
Through their education and training, lawyers can avail themselves
of this specialized language and rules.63
It is not only those with legal knowledge who understand that the
language of the law differs from ordinary language. Most lay people
recognize that they cannot fully comprehend the language of the
law.64 This incapacity stems in part from an inability to understand
many of the technical terms. But lay people also recognize that
there are aspects of the language that, unlike obviously technical
terms, they may not even realize are different—aspects such as
legal interpretive rules that do not apply to ordinary language.65
Thus, they worry about the danger of seeming to understand legal
language without actually doing so. For this reason, after reading
a legal document, a lay reader often says, “It seems fine to me, but
to be sure I need to check with my lawyer.”66
The recognition that the language of the law differs from ordinary
language is even reflected in ordinary language. When confronted
with particularly hard to understand legal language, people refer to
of lenity would apply to readings of the Constitution, and how the common law informs the
meaning of the language in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment).
59. See Jonathan Todres, Teaching Health Law: Beyond the Case Method: Teaching
Transactional Law Skills in the Classroom, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 375, 377 (2009).
60. See, e.g., TIERSMA, supra note 52, at 3; Todres, supra note 59, at 377.
61. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Lawrence Joseph and Law and Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
921, 930 (2009).
62. See, e.g., TIERSMA, supra note 52, at 3, 108.
63. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 45, at 710.
64. See Heikki E.S. Mattila, Legal Vocabulary, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE
AND LAW 27, 31 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012).
65. See id.; see also Schauer, supra note 39, at 501-02.
66. Legal language serves to put people on notice they need lawyers. See TIERSMA, supra
note 52, at 141.
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it as “legalese.”67 But while it is tempting to call the language of the
law legalese, that name would have a misleadingly pejorative
connotation.68 The language of the law does not necessarily consist
of opaque and technical terms that are difficult to parse and can
only be understood with effort by a lawyer. Indeed, the language of
the law is only in part composed of technical terms. As we argue
below, legal language also includes such majestic language as the
Constitution’s preamble.69
2. Features of the Language of the Law
What comprises the language of the law? As with other technical
languages, the language of the law can be thought of as a language
that builds on ordinary language, but then substantially supple-
ments and modifies it.70 Begin then with ordinary language. Under
the broad conception of language, ordinary language includes se-
mantic, syntactic, and interpretive rules. In each case, those rules
would be limited to ordinary language. An example of an ordinary
language interpretive rule is the rule that one assumes that an
ambiguous term should be construed in accordance with the subject
of an utterance.71
The language of the law then supplements and modifies ordinary
language. The most obvious addition consists of an ample technical
legal vocabulary.72 We can divide this vocabulary into two types of
words. Some words are unambiguously technical terms, such as the
constitutional term “Bill of Attainder.”73 These words have a legal
meaning, but no ordinary language meaning. However, other words,
67. See, e.g., Vincent L. Teahan, Why Don’t Our Clients Like Their Wills?, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
Nov. 1997, at 26, 28.
68. See MELLINKOFF, supra note 40, at 4.
69. See infra Part III.D.2.
70. See Samantha Hargitt, Note, What Could Be Gained in Translation: Legal Language
and Lawyer-Linguists in a Globalized World, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425, 427 (2013).
71. See 24 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA § 333 (2005). For example, if a speaker is
talking baseball, then the statement “that should work on the diamond” should be interpreted
to mean the baseball diamond rather than a gem.
72. See TIERSMA, supra note 52, at 108; Mattila, supra note 64, at 31.
73. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 37.
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like the term “property,” have both a technical and ordinary mean-
ing.74
The other basic way that the language of the law supplements
and modifies ordinary language is through the inclusion of legal
interpretive rules. Legal interpretive rules are rules for interpreting
documents written in the language of the law. Many of these rules
do not apply to ordinary documents. For example, the rule of lenity
is an interpretive rule that only applies to documents written in the
language of the law.75 People knowledgeable about the law recognize
this rule and draft enactments with the rule in mind.
While the technical vocabulary is the most obvious aspect of the
language of the law, it is the distinctive legal interpretive rules that
are more foundational; these rules often determine whether the
technical vocabulary has been employed. The legal interpretive
rules tell the interpreter under what circumstances to apply the
ordinary or the technical word meaning.76 Thus, legal interpretive
rules sometimes tell the interpreter to follow the ordinary meaning
and sometimes tell him to follow the legal meaning.77
The language of the law encompasses a variety of legal interpre-
tive rules. The most visible rules are those that provide guidance
about how to interpret legal language in specific situations. In
addition to the rule of lenity, prominent examples of these types of
rules are the rule governing the interpretation of preambles,78 the
rule that implied repeals are disfavored,79 the absurdity rule,80 the
rule that terms with both a legal meaning and an ordinary meaning
may be interpreted in accord with either meaning depending on the
74. See Jori, supra note 49, at 35. Such ambiguity has been recognized by the famous
language theorist, J.L. Austin. See J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 182-84 (J.O. Urmson
& G.J. Warnock eds., 2d ed. 1970). With respect to both types of words—unambiguous tech-
nical terms and terms with both ordinary and technical meanings—the technical meanings
would be excluded from the ordinary language.
75. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263,
1299 (1995).
76. See Mattila, supra note 64, at 31.
77. See infra Part I.A.3.
78. See Max H. Hulme, Comment, Preambles in Treaty Interpretation, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1281, 1290-91 (2016).
79. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 (1857).
80. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388 (2003).
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context,81 and the rule now referred to as intratextualism.82 Lawyers
regularly follow these rules when interpreting legal documents.
A second set of legal interpretive rules resembles the above group,
but are sometimes used when interpreting ordinary language.83 The
difference between these legal interpretive rules and the corre-
sponding ordinary interpretive rules, however, is that the legal
interpretive rules are applied more regularly and strictly to legal
documents than to ordinary documents.84 The naming of these rules
allows them to be readily invoked without elaborate explanation.
These rules include the rule that unclear provisions should be in-
terpreted in accord with the purpose and the structure of the
document,85 the antisurplusage rule,86 and the expressio unius rule.87
A third type of legal interpretive rule—and in some ways the most
theoretically interesting—indicates the object of interpretation and
the evidence that should be considered in determining that object.
For example, an interpretive rule might provide that the object of
the interpretation is the public meaning of the words in context. Or
it might say that the object of the interpretation is the intent of the
lawgiver. Either one of these legal interpretive rules could be part
of the language of the law.
Interpretive rules under this category also govern the type of
evidence to be examined in establishing the meaning of language.
Suppose that in the language of the law the object of interpretation
is the intended meaning of a law’s enactors. The legal interpretive
rules might then provide for consideration of legislative history to
determine the intent of the enactors. Alternatively, such interpre-
tive rules might prohibit use of the legislative history, looking
instead to plausible conjectures about the enactors’ intent based on
public circumstances and accepted values.
81. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
82. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999).
83. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012).
84. See J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 333 (1891).
85. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1493-94 (2005).
86. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 174.
87. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 84, at 410.
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The question of the type of evidence to be examined can arise in
various circumstances. One example involves the practice of inter-
preting the U.S. Constitution by looking to British constitutional
practices,88 from which many of the Constitution’s provisions were
derived. As Chief Justice John Marshall said in analyzing the
pardon power:
As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the
executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to
whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we
adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a
pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the
manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail
himself of it.89
A related practice guides the interpreter to look to Blackstone and
other leading British authorities for more precise understanding of
legal terms.90 These rules are distinctive to the language of the law
and are not present in ordinary language.91
This third type of legal interpretive rule is closely connected to
the interpretive debates among originalists (and to a lesser extent
other interpretive approaches) about whether to follow the original
public meaning or the original intent, and what evidence to consid-
er.92 While theorists have attempted to resolve these matters
through theoretical considerations, the language of the law suggests
that the resolution depends in significant part on the legal interpre-
tive rules that existed at the time of the Constitution’s enactment.93
If those rules required the interpreter to look to the original intent
88. See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L.J. 408, 428 (2010) (looking to the English law origins of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause).
89. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833). While this statement comes
later than those we would generally consider probative of original meaning, it is made by
Chief Justice Marshall who was himself a prominent member of the Virginia ratifying
convention. We are confident that this rule existed at the time of the Constitution.
90. See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 144-45 (2013); Williams, supra note 88, at 428.
91. See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO.
L.J. 341, 344-45 (2010).
92. See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 121-24.
93. For examples of the use of such rules, see infra Parts III.E-F.
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based on the legislative history, then even under an original-public-
meaning approach to interpretation, the interpreter would consider
the legislative history.94 The original public meaning would require
that intent be considered.95 Similarly, if the legal interpretive rules
required an interpreter to follow the meaning that a knowledgeable
and reasonable person would give to the language based on publicly
available sources, then an original-intent approach would require
that such public meaning be followed, because that would likely be
the intent of the enactors.96
Legal interpretive rules may be tied to the type of document in
which the language is written. While certain interpretive rules like-
ly apply to all legal documents, other interpretive rules are limited
to specific documents.97 Thus, specific rules apply to wills, contracts,
and statutes.98 Other rules apply to more than one category of
document or to all legal documents.99 Legal interpretive rules for the
Constitution may thus include the rules that applied to all legal
documents at the time, the rules that applied to both the Constitu-
tion and other types of enactments such as statutes, and the rules
that applied exclusively to the Constitution.100
3. Integrating Ordinary with Legal Language
This Article does not catalogue all the legal interpretive rules
deemed applicable to the Constitution. It does, however, refer to
many interpretive rules employed at the time of the writing of the
94. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 121, 123-24.
95. See id. at 123.
96. See id. at 123-25.
97. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519,
555-56 (2003) (explaining that this was true at the time of the Constitution’s enactment).
98. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489-90 (1989).
99. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629,
653 (2016) (suggesting that canons against redundancy apply to all legal documents).
100. See Nelson, supra note 97, at 555-56 (suggesting a special class of rules might apply
only to the Constitution). Nelson rightly notes that determining the full set of rules of
interpretation that apply to the Constitution is complicated. See id. at 556. We take no
position on the full set of those rules here, but simply suggest that they are to be understood
as part of the Constitution’s language or context under a broad or narrow conception of
language.
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Constitution.101 Here, though, we focus on one important interpre-
tive rule with significant implications for the argument that the
Constitution is written in the language of the law: the rule for re-
solving ambiguities between technical and ordinary language.
An important rule within the language of the law is the techni-
cal/ordinary language rule, which determines whether language
should be understood in its technical or ordinary sense.102 Under-
standing this rule shows why the view that a document is written
in the language of the law does not imply that the Constitution
consistently employs technical language. While the language of the
law includes all the technical legal language that lawyers employ,
it does not require that only technical terms be used, because it also
includes all ordinary language. Thus, when one encounters lan-
guage that has both a technical and ordinary meaning, one cannot
necessarily conclude it has one or the other meaning.
The technical/ordinary rule determines whether a term should be
given its ordinary or technical meaning.103 In general, the rule treats
this issue as one of ambiguity. There are two possible meanings to
the term—the technical and the ordinary language meaning—and
therefore the term is ambiguous.104 As with other ambiguities, the
resolution of the matter turns on various interpretive rules, such as
the purpose of the provision and the structure of the document.105
101. See infra Parts III.E-F (providing examples of such rules).
102. Another important legal interpretive rule is what we call the 51/49 rule—a rule that
tells the interpreter to choose the better attested meaning even if its probability of being the
meaning is merely 51 percent as compared with a 49 percent alternative. The rule thus
governs the resolution of close cases. It is our belief that the prevailing rule at the time of the
Constitution was to interpret provisions in constitutions and statutes based on the rule that
the stronger interpretation should be followed, even if that interpretation is only slighter
stronger than the competing one. The 51/49 rule is, of course, not the only conceivable rule.
An alternative rule might hold that an interpretation is only supported if the evidence is
considerably stronger for it than for its competitors.
103. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 453 (3d ed. 1858).
104. As was clear from the time of the early Republic. See id. (“[T]he same word often
possesses a technical, and a common sense.”); see also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
171, 176 (1796) (Chase, J.) (“What is the natural and common, or technical and appropriate,
meaning of the words, duty and excise, it is not easy to ascertain. They present no clear and
precise idea to the mind. Different persons will annex different significations to the terms.”).
105. See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (offering considerations to determine the meaning
of an ambiguous phrase); STORY, supra note 103, § 453 (suggesting presumptions in favor of
ordinary meaning with many examples in which context overcomes that presumption).
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4. Determining Which Rules Are Part of the Language of the
Law
One last theoretical issue involving the language of the law is how
much agreement there needs to be about the language. This issue
arises as to two matters. First, how much agreement about the lan-
guage generally is required to recognize it as a distinct language?
Second, how much agreement is required to recognize an interpre-
tive rule as part of that language? We argue that while a high
degree of agreement is needed to recognize a distinct language of
the law, much less agreement is needed to recognize particular rules
within the language.
The existence of a language of the law, as a language distinct
from ordinary English, requires wide agreement as to the overall
body of rules of this language.106 As with other languages, one can
identify a language among its speakers and users when both groups
know and follow a distinctive set of rules.107 If no group of people
embraces such a distinctive set of rules, it is doubtful that such a
language exists.
Consequently, to establish the language of the law as genuine, it
is necessary to show that the language is widely understood and
followed by its speakers.108 The language of the law clearly satisfies
this condition, because lawyers understand and follow this lan-
guage.109 While disagreements persist about particular aspects of
the language, lawyers widely recognize the existence of this lan-
guage generally and follow it.110
However, it is not necessary for all particular rules of the
language of the law to be widely accepted. A language can exist even
when individual rules are contested. In fact, disagreements about
proper language rules are normal, whether they involve the proper
meaning of terms or grammatical rules. Such disagreements about
individual rules, so long as they are not too common, do not cast
106. See DAVID BLOOR, WITTGENSTEIN, RULES AND INSTITUTIONS 16 (1997).
107. See id.
108. See WHITE, supra note 43, at 6-7.
109. See, e.g., id.; Schauer, supra note 39, at 502.
110. See WHITE, supra note 43, at 6-7.
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doubt on the existence of the language. Nor do they necessarily
deprive a contested rule of its status as part of the language.111
For example, consider the definition of a word or phrase that is
disputed, such as the phrase “beg the question.” The traditional
understanding meant “to use an argument that assumes as proved
the very thing one is trying to prove,” whereas a new usage is to
“raise the question.”112 Let us assume (probably counterfactually)
that English speakers are now relatively evenly divided about the
traditional and new usages, with the traditionalists comprising a
slightly larger group. Under a criterion that required rules and
meanings to be widely followed, this phrase would not be part of the
language—presumably it would have no meaning. But that is not
how people would understand this phrase. Rather, people would
probably assume that the more accepted meaning—the traditional
one, in our example—was the one that was employed. But the
interpreter would understand that some people use the phrase in
the alternative way, and would follow that meaning if the circum-
stances of the utterance pointed to the alternative meaning.
This example suggests that the widely accepted criterion is not
followed as to individual language rules. Instead, when language
rules provoke disagreement, the majority rule is likely to be pre-
sumed, but the minority rule might be followed when circumstances
so warrant.113
B. The Narrow Conception of the Language of the Law
In the previous Section, we assumed that the language of the law
includes word meanings, grammar, and interpretive rules. Thus, in
111. For examples of disagreement about interpretive rules that are nevertheless applied,
see infra notes 344-47 and accompanying text.
112. See Philip B. Corbett, Begging the Question, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008, 8:53
PM), https://afterdeadline.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/begging-the-question-again/ [https://
perma.cc/AJ4R-YSST].
113. Even if the widely accepted criterion were applied to individual rules within ordinary
language, that practice would not necessarily require that individual rules within the
language of the law meet this same criterion. Suppose there were a meta interpretive rule
within the language of the law providing that in case of disagreement about an interpretive
rule, one should follow the rule that had stronger support—a 51/49 rule for interpretive rules.
And suppose further that this 51/49 rule was widely followed. Then, the 51/49 rule would
determine the existence and content of legal interpretive rules, although the widely accepted
criterion is applied to determine individual interpretive rules within ordinary language.
2018] THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 1347
using that language, one invokes the applicable legal interpretive
rules. But under a narrower conception of language, the language
of the law includes only semantics and syntax, not interpretive
rules.
Nevertheless, accepting the narrow conception of the language of
the law does not change how one would interpret that language. The
philosophy of language has formalized the commonsense intuition
that the context of an utterance can greatly affect its meaning.
Legal interpretive rules, even if not part of the language of the law,
are still part of the context of that language. Consequently, these
legal interpretive rules should still be followed in determining the
meaning of utterances made in that language.
1. Pragmatics, Context, and Meaning
Even if the content of a language is narrowed to semantics and
syntax, that restriction does not imply that the meaning of words
uttered in the language is determined entirely by semantics and
syntax. Philosophers of language understand the meaning of words
to depend not only on semantics and syntax, but also on context.
The branch of the philosophy of language called pragmatics explores
how context contributes to meaning.114
Pragmatics focuses on usages of language in contexts that depart
from the literal meaning of the language. In many contexts, a
person asserts something that differs from the literal meaning of
their words. For example, a doctor examining a gunshot wound may
say to the patient, “You are not going to die.” While the literal
meaning of the statement suggests that the patient will never die,
we understand that in context the doctor was saying that the
114. See Solum, supra note 41, at 1126. In this Article, we use the term “meaning” to refer
to the proper interpretation of language in context, which is the focus of pragmatics. But
philosophers writing within pragmatics often distinguish between the semantic meaning of
the language and something else, which is the object of pragmatics. For example, Soames
distinguishes between the semantic meaning of the language of a text and “everything
asserted and conveyed in adopting” a text. See, e.g., 1 SCOTT SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts:
What Is, and Is Not, Special About the Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE:
WHAT IT MEANS AND HOW WE USE IT 408-09 (2008). Since distinctions of this type are not well
known in the academic legal literature, we have employed the more common usage of
“meaning.” But the basic point remains the same. Under an originalist analysis of words in
context, such as Soames’s, it is everything asserted and conveyed in adopting the Constitution
that is the object of originalism.
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patient would not die from the gunshot wound. Philosophers of
language understand that context can influence the meaning of a
statement in manifold ways.
The leading theory of how context can contribute to meaning is
that of Paul Grice. Under Grice’s view, the meaning of language
often does not turn solely on the semantic and syntactic rules of the
language.115 At times, the literal or semantic meaning differs from
the meaning of the words employed by the speaker in context. And
that latter meaning is the one understood by both the speaker and
the hearer. Sometimes the meaning implied by the context is
referred to as an implicature.116
According to Grice, language often takes its meaning from the
social settings in which words are uttered.117 Grice focuses on
conversational settings in which people usually act in a cooperative
fashion.118 This cooperative behavior yields a cooperative principle
that can be summarized: make your conversational contribution
helpful given the purpose and stage of the talk exchange in which
you are engaged.119 This cooperative principle yields four maxims
that people use in communicating with others: the maxims of quan-
tity, quality, relation, and manner.120 For example, the maxim of
quantity requires a speaker to “[m]ake [his] contribution as informa-
tive as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).”121
115. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22-40 (1st Harvard Univ. Press
paperback ed. 1991). Geoffrey Miller was the first to explore the implications of Grice for legal
interpretation. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 1179, 1182-84.
116. See Wayne Davis, Implicature, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY §§ 1-2
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature [https://perma.cc/
VA9W-S74E]; see also GRICE, supra note 115, at 39-40.
117. See GRICE, supra note 115, at 24-26.
118. See id. at 26.
119. Grice’s full description of the cooperative principle is, “Make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.; Miller, supra note 115, at 1194. The maxim of quality provides, “Try to make your
contribution one that is true.” GRICE, supra note 115, at 27; Miller, supra note 115, at 1202.
The maxim of relation provides, “Be relevant.” GRICE, supra note 115, at 27; Miller, supra
note 115, at 1218. The maxim of manner requires that one “[b]e perspicuous.” GRICE, supra
note 115, at 27; Miller, supra note 115, at 1220.
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Grice argued that speakers in conversational settings follow the
cooperative principle and the four resulting maxims.122 Listeners
expect speakers to do so.123 Based on the context and the maxims,
listeners often interpret the speaker’s words in ways that depart
from the literal meaning.124 For example, the patient knows that she
will die someday and therefore does not interpret the doctor to mean
that she will never die, a claim that would violate the maxim of
quality’s requirement that a speaker should not say what she
believes to be false. Instead, the patient interprets the statement as
relating to dying from the gunshot wound.
As this example shows, the literal meaning of the terms in the
statement is not sufficient for understanding its meaning. Instead,
the meaning must be understood by reference to the context—in
particular, by reference to the maxims that govern cooperative
conversation, by the possibility that speakers might flout those
maxims, and by consideration of the possible meanings that the
words might have.125
122. GRICE, supra note 115, at 26.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 31-32.
125. See Miller, supra note 115, at 1191-93. Significantly, some of the legal interpretive
rules—in particular, many of the traditional canons of legal interpretation—appear to be
consistent with or flow directly from the maxims of conversation. See id. at 1195-1202. For a
discussion of how Grice’s maxims might be applied to a question of constitutional
interpretation, see John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language:
Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2015).
While the maxims of conversation and implicatures seem to support many of the canons of
interpretation, we should note one complication of Miller’s analysis. Miller relies on a
situation in which two people are communicating with one another in an apparently equal and
cooperative situation. See Miller, supra note 115, at 1201. Legal enactments, such as
constitutions and statutes, differ from that situation in that they tend to involve directives
or orders. See Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More than It Says? On Some Pragmatic
Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 83, 83
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
It is not clear that precisely the same norms apply in this directive situation as in a
cooperative situation. While the maxims may differ somewhat, it would be a mistake to
overemphasize the differences. In a situation involving direction, the underlying maxims
appear to be similar to those for conversation. The director wants the directed person to
understand his communication, so that the directed will know what to do. The directed person
wants to understand the direction to comply with it. Therefore, the communication has strong
elements of cooperation. See Miller, supra note 115, at 1201. While the director could seek to
deceive the directed (or vice versa), the same could occur in a cooperative conversation. In
both situations, the deception would be likely to violate the relevant maxims. See id. at 1208.
Moreover, in democratic politics the enactors are not simply issuing directives, but are
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2. The Context of Statements Made in the Language of the Law
With this understanding of the importance of context to the
content of a communication, we turn to statements made in the
language of the law. We continue to assume here that a language
includes only semantics and syntax, but not interpretive rules.
In this situation, the context of the statement made in the
language of the law clearly includes legal interpretive rules. A
speaker assumes that listeners will employ these interpretive rules.
That assumption makes those interpretive rules part of the context.
For example, when someone writes a criminal prohibition into a
statute, it is understood that the rule of lenity applies and that, in
close cases, the prohibition will be interpreted to favor the criminal
defendant. Consequently, the interpretation of the provision may
differ from what it would have been if the rule of lenity did not exist.
Yet, the people who wrote the statute—as well as those reading
it—would have understood that this interpretive rule would apply.
It is true that legal interpretive rules may sometimes lead to the
conclusion that the meaning of the provision departs from its literal
meaning. But that departure does not distinguish legal interpretive
rules from other implicatures. Legal interpretive rules also lead
communicating through their enactments to the voters who elect them.
Andrei Marmor argues that communication in the legislature (and in other legal contexts)
differs significantly from ordinary conversation because the former involves strategic speech
and norms. See Marmor, supra, at 83. Negotiations in the legislature involve strategic
communications, in which the parties may not be fully cooperative or even honest. See id. But
these strategic communications are not especially relevant to legal interpretation for two
reasons. First, these strategic communications involve negotiations, not the directing of the
public through authorized laws. See id. at 94. Directions, especially to the public, are subject
to cooperative maxims. Only if the public treats these negotiations as informing the meaning
of the legal directive will that strategic speech affect the meaning of the directive. However,
this approach to legislative history has often been strongly criticized. See Miller, supra note
115, at 1179-80. Second, even if legislators are strategic with one another, judges are unlikely
to credit these deceptions. Judges are obligated to view the parties from an impartial
perspective. Thus, if a legislator engaged in deceptive speech, the judge would be unlikely to
accept it as true.
Consider an ordinary language deception. John asks Bob, “Are you going to the party?”
Bob’s response—“I have to work”—clearly implies that Bob is not going to the party. See
Davis, supra note 116, § 1. If Bob goes to the party, he might try to justify his statement by
claiming that he never said that he was not going to the party. But an impartial observer
would conclude that Bob had clearly implied he was not going. If a similar exchange occurred
between legislators about the meaning of a bill, a judge reviewing the exchange would be
likely to treat Bob’s statement as asserting that he was not going to the party.
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words written in the language of the law to be given different mean-
ings than they would if written in ordinary language. But, again,
that difference is not a problem. In the legal situation, the context
differs from the ordinary language situation.
There are two ways to understand these legal interpretive rules
as part of the context that contributes to the meaning of statements
made in the language of the law. One way is to understand them as
deriving from Grice’s conversational maxim of quantity, which
requires the speaker to make his contribution as informative as
required for the current purposes of the exchange.126 Under this
view, people who use the language of the law—both the authors and
the audience—know that the legal interpretive rules apply to
statements made in that language.127 Consequently, if the authors
say nothing to indicate that those legal interpretive rules do not
apply, the audience properly interprets this language in accord with
those rules.128 If the authors intended to depart from the rules, then
it is reasonable to assume that they would have indicated that.129
The second way to understand legal interpretive rules is simply
as a part of the context of the statement. Under this view, one need
not link legal interpretive rules to a specific maxim of conversation
within Grice’s theory. There are, after all, various theories that
discuss conversational and other implicatures.130 The basic point is
that when people use the language of the law, legal interpretive
rules are part of the context of that language. Thus, any theory that
takes context into account should apply the legal interpretive rules
to utterances made in the language of the law.
One question about treating the legal interpretive rules as con-
text is the scope of those rules. Does the context include only the le-
gal interpretive rules known to all speakers of the language of the
126. See GRICE, supra note 115, at 26.
127. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 113 (2001).
128. If the authors had said something to depart from the applicable legal interpretive
rules—if, for example, they had noted that this criminal prohibition should not be interpreted
using the rule of lenity—this would be an example of cancelling the implicature. According
to Grice, one of the key features of an implicature is that it can be cancelled. See GRICE, supra
note 115, at 39.
129. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50 (2002) (noting that Congress must
be understood to legislate against certain background principles).
130. See Davis, supra note 116, § 2.
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law? Or does it include all the actual legal interpretive rules—that
is, all the rules that can be confirmed by consulting written and
other expert sources—even if not everyone knows them?
In our view, the legal context includes all the actual legal inter-
pretive rules. First, when lawyers write formal documents in the
language of the law, they expect all the actual legal interpretive
rules to apply to the document.131 It is true that a lawyer may
realize that she does not know all the rules. But the lawyer
endeavors to learn additional rules to follow them in the document.
Moreover, if another lawyer mentions a rule about which the author
was ignorant, the author is likely to learn the rule and follow it in
the document.132 Thus, lawyers treat the actual legal interpretive
rules as context when writing in the language of the law.
Second, this practice of lawyers considering the actual legal
interpretive rules, rather than the interpretive rules known by
parties to a communication, reflects the design of legal language to
reduce uncertainty in communications between multiple authors
and readers. Because there are multiple authors and readers of
legal language, it is extremely difficult to determine which legal
interpretive rules would have been known by these different people.
Moreover, the difficulty of determining what rules were known and
determining how many people were required to know the rules
strongly argues for following the actual rules of the language of the
law. The need to avoid uncertainty seems especially important as to
legal language, which is often used to render rights and obligations
more certain.133
Third, one might think it odd for context to include rules that
might require the audience to look them up in books. After all,
conversational implicatures are often informal and just known by
the speakers. But the difference in context here makes all the
difference. An informal conversation differs substantially from a
formal legal writing. Formal legal writings are typically written and
read under a practice that allows both the author and audience to
131. See Manning, supra note 127, at 113 (noting relevant rules are those applied by “any
‘reasonably diligent lawyer’”).
132. Cf. Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38
VILL. L. REV. 403, 418 (1993).
133. See, e.g., supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing the use of legal lan-
guage to render meaning more precise).
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take time with the document—allowing them to ponder the writing,
to look up unfamiliar matters, and to consult experts. By contrast,
informal conversation normally assumes that the parties have all
relevant information at the ready and in part for that reason people
may forego using vocabulary in informal conversation that they sus-
pect the other party does not understand.
To conclude, then, the context of utterances made in the language
of the law shows that they should be understood in accord with the
actual legal interpretive rules. As a result, statements made in the
language of the law are properly interpreted in the same way
whether one adopts the broad view of language—in which the legal
interpretive rules are part of the language—or the narrow view—in
which the legal interpretive rules are part of the context. Thus, in
the remainder of this Article, we largely ignore the issue of whether
the legal interpretive rules are part of the language or context, and
simply speak of a statement being made in the language of the law
to cover both possibilities.
C. The Law of Interpretation’s Critique of the Language of the Law
Recently, William Baude and Stephen Sachs criticized the view
of the language of the law offered here.134 They argued that many
legal interpretive rules are not part of the language of the law, and
thus not part of the meaning of legal documents.135 Instead, they
claimed that these legal interpretive rules are part of what Baude
and Sachs called the “law of interpretation.”136 The law of interpre-
tation exists outside the language of the law; it is part of the law.137
In particular, it is part of the general common law—that is, judge-
made or judge-found law of no particular jurisdiction.138
Baude and Sachs concede that legal texts may be written in a
“specialized vocabulary and linguistic conventions that legally
trained people use to talk to one another.”139 But this concession to
134. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1135-36 (2017).
135. See id. at 1093.
136. See id. at 1095-96.
137. See id. at 1093, 1095.
138. See id. at 1137.
139. See id. at 1086-87 (emphasis added) (citing Schauer, supra note 39).
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the language-of-the-law view appears to exclude some legal inter-
pretive rules and thus does not fully capture that view as we have
described it. Baude and Sachs based their reason for excluding cer-
tain legal interpretive rules from the language of the law on their
claim that only linguistic rules reflect the regularities of language.140
In contrast, they believe that other legal interpretive rules reflect
normative considerations that the law brings to textual interpreta-
tion.
We dispute that their reasons distinguish these nonlinguistic
interpretive rules from other aspects of the language of the law—as-
pects, like specialized technical terms, that they themselves rec-
ognize. First, even nonlinguistic legal interpretive rules reflect
regularities of language—the way lawyers use language. Within the
community of lawyers, the rule of lenity fixes the meaning of a
phrase in a legal enactment no less than linguistic rules.141 Lawyers
draft and interpret criminal provisions against the background of
this rule no less than they do against the background of linguistic
rules.
It is possible that not all lawyers grasp all the legal interpretive
rules as fully as people grasp linguistic rules. But as we have
discussed above,142 that difference is not surprising. Law is a delib-
erative, written language that people draft and read with the expec-
tation that they may need to look up unfamiliar rules. Moreover, the
same need for resort to reference is true of specialized technical
terms: many, if not most, lawyers at the time of the framing would
have lacked a full understanding of a specialized term like ex post
facto law.143 Thus, what makes for regularities of language may
differ in the language of the law from ordinary languages.
Second, the normative origins of certain legal interpretive rules
do not place them outside the language of the law. The rule of len-
ity no doubt reflected normative considerations as it evolved.144 But
its applicability to the Constitution depends on whether it was
positively accepted as a rule of interpretation at the time of the
140. See id. at 1088.
141. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 360-62 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty of the
Philadelphia Convention about the precise meaning of ex post facto law).
144. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 93, 95 (1968).
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Constitution’s enactment.145 The parallel between legal interpretive
rules and specialized legal meanings of words is striking in this
respect. The technical meaning of terms in the Constitution, like
“Bill of Attainder,” also evolved because of normative concerns.146
Yet, in the Constitution it has a fixed meaning as a technical legal
term based on the understanding current at the time of its enact-
ment.147
The recognition that legal language reflects normative consider-
ations and sometimes requires a reader to look up unknown terms
responds to Baude and Sachs’s specific claim that, to be part of the
legal language, the antisurplusage canon must reflect only linguistic
regularities, rather than attempt to make drafters do their work
better. They argue:
It’s no answer to say, as some defenders of the surplusage canon
do, that “[s]tatutes should be carefully drafted, and encouraging
courts to ignore sloppily inserted words results in legislative
free-riding”—or that legislators “ought to hire eagle-eyed
editors” to conform draft bills to the canon. The linguistic canons
were made for man, not man for the linguistic canons.148
But this is not true. There is no reason that language conventions
cannot have a prescriptive element. The language of the law allows
men and women to communicate, and rules that promote clear
communication are a common aspect of language. If these language
rules are violated enough, they may cease to be conventions. But
until that time, these rules can function in a prescriptive manner to
promote social purposes.
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
With this understanding of the language of the law, we now show
that the Constitution is written in this language. We start by
145. See Nelson, supra note 97, at 523-24.
146. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; see also Williams, supra note 88, at 452-56.
147. For more general criticisms of Baude and Sachs’ view of the law of interpretation, see
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Perplexities of a Law of Interpretation
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
148. Baude & Sachs, supra note 134, at 1126-27 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 179).
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explaining how one determines the language in which a document
is written. In the course of that explanation, we discuss some of the
reasons why we conclude that the Constitution is written in the
language of the law. We then address two challenges to our argu-
ment—that determining the language of the document is not the
way to determine its original meaning, and that interpreting the
Constitution in the language of the law has serious normative defici-
encies. We then conclude by discussing the alternative to the claim
that the Constitution is written in the language of the law—the
view that the Constitution is written in ordinary language. We show
that the ordinary-language view suffers from serious problems that
prevent it from accounting for the Constitution’s language.
A. Determining that the Constitution Is Written in the
Language of the Law
It is our thesis that the Constitution is written in the language of
the law. Here we address the question of how one makes that deter-
mination, and offer some of the reasons why we conclude that the
Constitution is written in that language.
1. Examining the Language of the Document
The main way to determine the language in which a document is
written is to examine that language. To see if a document is written
in English or French, or in Middle English or Modern English, or in
ordinary English or technical legal English, one would first read the
document and see what words it used, what syntax it exhibited, and
what interpretive rules it employed.149 Significantly, making that
determination requires knowledge of the relevant languages in
which the document might have been written. Without knowing
Middle English, it would be difficult to choose between Modern
149. We make the comparison between English and French to make obvious the relevance
of consulting the text to determine the language in which a document is written. We recognize
that the difference between ordinary language and legal language is a subtler one, and thus
use other comparisons, like that between British and American English, to bring out that
subtlety where required. The relation between a technical language and its ordinary parent
language is unique and cannot be fully captured by a comparison of either different languages
or of different dialects of the same language. But these comparisons still illuminate the
question of how to determine whether a document is written in a technical language.
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English and Middle English. Without knowing technical legal
English, it would be difficult to choose between ordinary English
and the language of the law.
In many cases, the identity of the relevant language is obvious. To
someone who knows French and English, which of these two
languages a document is written in is clear. But when the languages
are more similar, the question is harder. Determining which of two
dialects is being employed—say, British English or American En-
glish—may be even more difficult. Similarly, determining whether
a document is written in ordinary language or a technical language
requires knowledge of both languages.150 In arguing that the
Constitution is written in the language of the law, we spend
considerable time examining the language of the Constitution. We
show that in various ways its language should be understood as us-
ing legal terms and legal interpretive rules. The language contains
numerous technical terms. Similarly, we show that the Constitution
employed distinctive legal forms, such as preambles, that are
interpreted with legal interpretive rules. We also show that the
Constitution assumes the application of legal interpretive rules.
These legal terms and interpretive rules make it difficult for the
Constitution to be viewed as written in ordinary language.
2. The Language in Which the Same Type of Documents Are
Written
The words and interpretive rules employed are, of course, the
strongest evidence for identifying the language of a document. But
in cases in which the possible languages are similar to one another
(as with British and American English or technical and ordinary
language), other types of evidence can prove important. One
significant piece of evidence involves the language in which
documents of the same type are typically written. If medical records,
such as postoperative reports, are normally written in the language
of medicine, then that practice provides some evidence that a
150. If one does not know the language of the law, one could still determine that the
Constitution was not written in ordinary English, even though one could not be sure that it
was written in the language of the law. Combined with other cues from the document, such
as the fact that it is a legal document, someone who did not know the language of the law
could still make a reasonably good guess that it was written in the language of the law.
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particular medical record is also written in that language. Similarly,
if constitutions and similar documents at the time were written in
the language of the law, that practice would provide additional
evidence that the U.S. Constitution was written in the language of
the law. In the next Part, we present evidence that prior state
constitutions were written in the language of the law.
3. The Purposes of the Document
Another kind of evidence concerns the purposes of the document.
An author may choose a specific language because that language
advances his purposes. For example, a doctor may choose to com-
municate medical information about a patient’s condition with
another doctor in the technical language of medicine because that
language allows more precision. Those same considerations apply
to writing the Constitution in the language of the law.
In the case of the Constitution, the document has several
different purposes. One purpose—perhaps its principal purpose—is
to state the fundamental law so that government officials can
implement it.151 Writing the document in the language of the law
furthers this purpose. The precision of the language of the law
enables government officials to more accurately implement the
Constitution’s provisions, because they either know the language of
the law or have access to people who know it.
Another purpose is to communicate the fundamental law, so that
a decision can be made whether to adopt it or change it.152 Under the
Constitution, the decision to adopt the Constitution or to amend it
is made principally by officials or elites. For example, amendments
are passed either by legislatures or by conventions composed of
representatives.153 Once again, this purpose would be furthered by
writing the Constitution and the amendments in the language of the
law because that language communicates such matters more
precisely.
151. As is clear from, among other things, the obligations to follow the Constitution im-
posed on officials. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
152. See Adam Shinar, Dissenting from Within: Why and How Public Officials Resist the
Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 601, 619 n.84 (2013) (acknowledging this purpose).
153. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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It is true that ordinary citizens as voters also participate in
adoption or amendment. They elect the representatives who make
these decisions. If those citizens do not know the language of the
law, then using the language would hinder their participation. But
several reasons suggest that this disadvantage is considerably
smaller in terms of the purposes of the Constitution’s enactors than
the advantages generated by the language of the law.
Representative government assumes that the representatives
possess more knowledge about issues than the voters do.154 The
voters generally make the broad value choices, while the representa-
tives work out the details and implementation of those values.155
The language of the law conforms to this division of labor. Under
this arrangement, voters who understand only ordinary language
can understand the broad values and basic outline of the matters
contained in constitutional language. They can then cast their votes
for representatives who will make informed decisions on the details
of the law that further the voters’ values.
Public debate also informs the voters. If a voter was interested
enough in an ordinary language provision to read about it, which
would often be necessary to make an informed decision, that same
voter could read explanations by lawyers about a provision in the
language of the law, and then make an informed decision about it.
During the debates over the ratification of the Constitution, a
significant portion of the essays pro and con involved discussion
about what the terms in constitutional provisions, including the
legal terms, actually meant.156
Given the representative nature of the Constitution, it is not clear
to what extent, if any, the fact that ordinary voters do not know the
language of the law counts as a factor suggesting that the Constitu-
tion is not written in that language. But even if it so regarded, this
factor seems far outweighed by other factors pointing in the opposite
direction—such as that a document in the language of the law
154. See Adrian Vermeule, Congress and the Costs of Information: A Response to Jane
Schacter, 89 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681, 684 (2009).
155. See George A. Nation III, We the People: The Consent of the Governed in the Twenty-
First Century: The People’s Unalienable Right to Make Law, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 319, 368-69
(2012).
156. See Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Com-
ment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 289 (1987).
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improves both the process of implementing and amending the
fundamental law.
4. The Authors and Addressees of the Document
Another piece of evidence—somewhat related to the purpose of
the document—concerns the authors of and the audience for the
Constitution. If the authors or the audience did not know the lan-
guage of the law, then that might suggest that the document was
not written in that language.
While similar, these two bits of evidence have different weight. If
the authors did not know the language, then such ignorance offers
strong evidence that the document was not written in that lan-
guage. By contrast, if people to whom the document was addressed
did not understand the language, such ignorance would offer weaker
evidence to conclude it was not written in that language. A writer
who did understand both languages might yet choose to use the one
not fully understood by its recipient if she had reason to write in
that language—such as knowing that language better or believing
it was a better language for expressing her point—and she believed
that someone would be available to translate the letter to the recip-
ient.157 Such an action would be even more likely if the languages in
question were quite similar, such as British and American English
or ordinary language and the language of the law. In that case, the
recipient could understand much of the language without assis-
tance.
These considerations also support the language-of-the-law view.
The authors of the Constitution were the Philadelphia Convention,
a super elite who were dominated by those who were learned in the
law.158 That Convention then appointed a Committee of Detail to
mold its resolutions into a coherent document.159 Four of the five
members of this committee were lawyers: James Wilson, Oliver
157. For example, a doctor who knew the technical language of medicine might use that
language in a letter about an ailment to his friend who did not have medical training because
the doctor believed that the technical term more precisely described his meaning and he
expected his friend to consult with doctors about the matter.
158. Thirty-three of the fifty-five delegates were lawyers. See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY
R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 101 (new ed. 1937).
159. See William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 202-03 (2012).
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Ellsworth, John Rutledge, and Edmund Randolph.160 And not just
any lawyers, but the most distinguished lawyers of a body that was
already largely made up of lawyers.161 The first three were ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court, the latter two as Chief Justice.162 The
fourth became the first Attorney General of the United States.163 It
was the work of the Committee of Detail that formed the basis of the
Constitution’s language, which the Philadelphia Convention ap-
proved and the state conventions later ratified.164 Thus, the authors
of the Constitution recognized it was written in the language of the
law.
The intended audience for the Constitution is more diverse,
falling into three groups. The first group is the officials, such as
judges and other officers, who implement and conform government
actions to the Constitution.165 The second group is the officials who
decide whether to enact the Constitution or to amend it.166 The third
group is the voting public, who elect the representatives who will
then determine—either in conventions or legislatures—whether to
ratify or amend the Constitution.167
As with the analysis of the purposes of the Constitution, the great
majority of the people involved here know (or have easy access to
those who know) the language of the law. And the one group that
does not know the language—the voters—can still generally
understand the language, which is sufficient for their limited role
of selecting representatives.
5. Inferences from a Document Written in the Name of the
People
One possible argument against the proposition that the Constitu-
tion is written in the language of the law is that the document
claims to speak in the name of “We the People,” not “We the
160. See id.
161. See id. at 203.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 201-03.
165. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
166. See id. art. V.
167. See id.
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Lawyers.”168 Thus, the argument would run, a document written in
the name of the people must reflect a popular understanding. This
inference about the nature of the Constitution’s language is thought
to be confirmed by ratification of the document by special conven-
tions elected by popular vote.169
But this objection is mistaken. It was a common occurrence when
the Constitution was written, as it is today, for a client to have their
lawyer draft documents in legal language that speak in the client’s
name.170 That the document is drafted in the client’s name does not
transform the document’s language from the language of the law
into ordinary language.
Moreover, the participation of the people in drafting and ratifying
the Constitution was similar to, but even less than, the participa-
tion of a client when a lawyer drafts a document for him. A lawyer
normally writes a document for an individual pursuant to the
individual’s instructions. While the Constitution was written pursu-
ant to instructions from the Continental Congress and the state
legislatures,171 the drafters appeared to depart from those instruc-
tions in significant ways.172 An individual learns about the contents
of the document he is to sign from his lawyer. Similarly, the public
could discern the Constitution’s meaning from the ratification de-
bates about its meaning by people with legal knowledge.173 Finally,
while an individual makes the decision whether to assent to the
document written on his behalf, the people did not directly assent.
That was the responsibility of their elected representatives.
B. Is the Language of the Document the Correct Standard?
Larry Solum contests our analysis of how the language of a legal
document should be identified. In a recent article, Solum argued
that the Constitution should not be interpreted in accordance with
168. See id. pmbl.
169. See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 293, 340 (2009).
170. See Douglas Litowitz, Legal Writing: Its Nature, Limits, and Dangers, 49 MERCER L.
REV. 709, 711 (1998).
171. See BEEMAN, supra note 169, at 20.
172. See Christopher Terranova, Note, The Constitutional Life of Legislative Instructions
in America, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1340-41, 1340 n.61 (2009).
173. See, e.g., infra notes 362-69 and accompanying text.
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the language of the law, because many of the people to whom it was
addressed—the citizens of the United States—would not have
known that language (and some of the people who wrote the
Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention were not lawyers).174
Solum’s analysis appears to be based on his idea that a constitu-
tion written in the language of the law would violate the conditions
for successful communication.175 While oral, face-to-face communica-
tions reasonably rely on a rich information context of facial expres-
sion, hand motions, and immediate clarifications, other documents,
like the Constitution, are drafted in private and then issued to the
public only in written form.176 In this situation, Solum argues that
one must normally rely on the conventional semantic meaning of
the document, plus some other publicly available information.177
Since such information is publicly available, Solum’s approach
meets the conditions for successful communication. In contrast,
Solum believes that a constitution written in the language of the
law would not meet the conditions for successful communication,
because most of the public at large to whom it is addressed would
not have knowledge of the language of the law or the legal
context.178
We disagree with Solum’s analysis. The knowledge of the person
to whom the writing is addressed is not the sole or the most
important consideration in determining whether to treat the
language as having a legal meaning. Rather, the key issue is the
language in which the document is written. For example, if a letter
is written in French, then its terms should be understood in accord
with their French meanings, regardless of whether the addressee
knows French or not. The addressee may not understand the letter,
but may be able to have the letter translated into English. But even
if translation were not possible, the meaning of the letter would not
174. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 479, 497, 506 (2013).
175. See id. at 492, 497, 506.
176. See id. at 493-96.
177. See id. at 498-99.
178. See id. at 492, 497, 506. Solum also argues that some of the authors of the Consti-
tution at the Philadelphia Convention did not have this legal knowledge. See id. at 506. Of
course, if a document is jointly authored, it is not necessary for all the authors to have full
knowledge of all its provisions. The lawyers at the Convention could explain the legal
intricacies to the nonlawyers.
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change, which would be the meaning of the language in French.
Similarly, if the document is written in the language of the law, it
should be understood in that language even if some readers do not
understand it.
An author’s audience is simply one factor—and not the most
important—in the analysis of what language the writing is in and
what meaning it should be given. The most important consideration
in determining that language and meaning are the words of the
document. If the language is not clear, then other considerations
would be relevant, including the type of document in which the
language appears,179 the purposes of the communication,180 and the
persons to whom it is addressed.181 We have argued above that these
factors favor understanding the Constitution in the language of the
law.
C. A Brief Normative Digression
It might be argued that ordinary citizens will be deceived or
confused as to the meaning of the Constitution as written in the
language of the law. They might believe it is written in ordinary
language. If it is then given its legal meaning, people may support
(or reject) the constitutional provisions based on a mistaken under-
standing.
This argument is not directly relevant to our thesis, which makes
an interpretive rather than normative argument for reading the
Constitution in the language of the law. Even if people would be
deceived by the Constitution, that circumstance would not change
the meaning of the Constitution. It would simply imply that the
communication had not been successful for some of the people in the
communication. Of course, communications are often not successful,
because people become confused or misunderstand what is being
said due to mistakes, carelessness, or other causes.
Yet, normative considerations sometimes influence people’s re-
ceptivity to interpretive arguments. As a result, we briefly rebut the
claim that the people would be confused or deceived by a Constitu-
179. See supra Part II.A.2.
180. See supra Part II.A.3.
181. See supra Part II.A.4.
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tion written in the language of the law. First, as we describe below,
the language of the Constitution makes clear that it is written in
the language of the law. The Constitution contains many technical
terms that ordinary speakers would recognize as legal. In addition,
it contains legal forms, such as preambles, and legal interpretive
rules, like the Ninth Amendment,182 that are not normally used in
legal documents. In fact, the Constitution itself explicitly states it
is law.183 Overall, then, a person reading the Constitution would
recognize that it is not an ordinary language document.
Solum concedes that an ordinary reader would know that
individual terms that were patently technical would have legal
meanings.184 But Solum appears to argue that such a reader would
not know that other terms, which are latently technical, could be
given legal meanings.185 We doubt this argument, because an
ordinary reader, when confronted with a document that contains
many patently technical terms as well as other legal forms, would
have good reason to believe that the entire document might require
legal knowledge to understand it. Thus, he would not be reasonably
deceived or confused as to its meaning.
Second, people who were ignorant of the Constitution’s legal
language would still be able to acquire information about the
Constitution from the public debates about the document. Lawyers
both supported and opposed the ratifying of the Constitution.186
Thus, if supporters of the Constitution attempted to deceive or
mislead those who lacked legal knowledge, many knowledgeable
opponents could inform the voters of this fact.
Moreover, a document written in the language of the law can be
understood in general terms by someone who knows only ordinary
English. It will most often be the details of the provisions that will
182. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
183. See id. art. VI, cl. 2.
184. This position seems to follow from his narrow understanding of the semantic meaning
of technical terms—that they are those that a layman would understand are defined by
experts. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 54-55 (Ill. Public Law Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 07-24, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 [https://perma.cc/
P5GG-XH9V].
185. See id.
186. Representative examples of legal opponents include Alexander Hamilton and Brutus.
See generally Shlomo Slonim, Federalist No. 78 and Brutus’ Neglected Thesis on Judicial
Supremacy, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 7 (2006) (discussing Brutus’s concerns about judicial
supremacy and Hamilton’s response).
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differ, with the language of the law providing a specific meaning to
a concept that is more indeterminate in ordinary language.187
Thus, use of the language of the law does not significantly mis-
lead the public. By contrast, the advantages of that language can be
quite significant. Especially from an originalist perspective, the
language of the law promotes a more accurate and constraining
Constitution. It promotes accuracy about the meaning of what was
enacted, better fixes limits on government, and leaves fewer gaps
into which officials can place their own values.
D. An Exploration of the Ordinary-Language View
Determining whether the Constitution is written in the language
of the law also requires consideration of the alternative claim—that
the Constitution is written in ordinary language. Ultimately, one
must choose between these claims to determine in what language
the Constitution was written. Here we explore a couple of versions
of the ordinary-language view, showing that they suffer from serious
difficulties in accounting for the Constitution’s language.
In its most basic form, the ordinary-language view holds that the
Constitution is written in ordinary language. Since technical terms
and legal interpretive rules are not part of ordinary language or its
context, these terms and rules would appear to be excluded from the
Constitution.
The problem with this view is that, as we show below, the Consti-
tution clearly contains technical terms and assumes legal interpre-
tive rules.188 Consider, for example, the term “Bill of Attainder,”189
which is not part of ordinary language, but only part of the language
of the law. The ordinary-language view lacks resources for interpret-
ing that term.
A defender of the ordinary-language view might respond that the
existence of a few technical terms is not a serious problem.190
Imagine that a letter was written in English, but contained one or
two French terms. One would simply interpret the letter in English,
187. See, e.g., supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
188. See infra Parts III.B, III.D.
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
190. See Caton, supra note 40, at vii-viii.
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and treat the French terms as a minor exception that is otherwise
ignored.
Though this solution may work for the letter, it cannot work for
the Constitution. As we show below, the Constitution encompasses
many technical terms.191 In addition, the Constitution also assumes
and refers to distinctively legal interpretive rules.192 One cannot
cordon off these terms and rules as if they were an isolated excep-
tion. Instead, they put the reader on notice that the whole document,
and not merely isolated technical terms, requires that she consult
someone with legal knowledge.
Solum has offered another possible solution to addressing
technical terms within an ordinary-language view even if there are
quite a few technical terms within a document.193 Solum argued that
when an ordinary reader confronts a patently technical term, such
as “Letter of Marque and Reprisal,” the reader will reason that this
does not seem like a part of ordinary language.194 Rather, it appears
to be a technical term that requires the expertise of a lawyer to
understand it.195 In this way, the ordinary reader using ordinary
language can be thought to process, if not understand, patently
technical terms as terms that require legal knowledge.196
But Solum’s analysis applies only to patently technical terms—
terms that on their face indicate that they are technical. By
contrast, for the many latently technical terms in the Constitu-
tion—terms that have both an ordinary and technical meaning, such
as the term property—his response is wholly ineffective. Since the
ordinary reader will be aware of only the ordinary meaning, Solum’s
analysis thus does not interpret latently technical terms to have a
technical meaning, even if the available evidence suggests that they
have such a meaning.197
191. See infra Part III.B.
192. See infra Part III.D.
193. See Solum, supra note 184, at 54.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 54-55.
196. Solum says this maneuver involves the linguistic division of labor, which he borrows
from Hilary Putnam’s work in philosophy. See id. at 55 (citing 2 HILARY PUTNAM, The Mean-
ing of ‘Meaning,’ in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 215, 215 (1975)).
The idea is that the meaning of some terms requires the understanding of experts. See id.
197. On this problem generally, see Mattila, supra note 64, at 31. For a discussion of such
terms in the Constitution, see infra notes 243-54 and accompanying text.
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We are also skeptical of Solum’s response as applied to patently
technical terms. First, an indication on the face of the language that
a term can only be understood by someone with special knowledge
does not make that term part of the ordinary language or under-
standable to the ordinary reader. To the contrary, it suggests that
the term is not part of the ordinary language and not understand-
able to the ordinary reader.
Solum appears to argue that people will consult experts when
they encounter a term that appears to require such expertise.198 But
even if that practice were followed, it would not imply that the term
was part of ordinary language or understandable to lay people.
Thus, this argument proves too much. That lay people may consult
experts to understand technical terms does not suggest that the
technical terms are part of a language that has been effectively com-
municated to them.199
III. THE LINGUISTIC AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCE THAT THE
CONSTITUTION IS WRITTEN IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
In the previous Parts, we argued that there is a language of the
law and indicated how one would know that the Constitution is
written in that language. Here we present some of the empirical
evidence that supports that conclusion—evidence concerning the
legal vocabulary of the Constitution, evidence showing that the
Constitution’s language contains clear indications legal interpretive
rules should be employed in interpreting it, and evidence indicating
that early interpreters of both the Constitution and the state
constitutions that preceded it regularly applied legal interpretive
rules to the documents.
198. See Solum, supra note 184, at 55.
199. Nor is it clear that Putnam’s linguistic division of labor argument helps Solum’s case.
Putnam argued that people often rely on a linguistic division of labor in the sense that the
meaning of many terms requires an expert’s knowledge that ordinary people lack. See 2
HILARY PUTNAM, The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’ in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: MIND, LANGUAGE AND
REALITY 215, 227-28 (1975). But the situation Solum describes differs from that used by
Putnam. Putnam’s article is not principally about patently technical terms. Instead, it is
about terms like water or elm tree, which are not thought of as being technical. See id. at 223,
226. Putnam’s point is that one might require expert knowledge to fully understand or apply
these terms. See id. at 227-28. But this need for expertise does not suggest that all patently
technical terms are communicated to ordinary readers.
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This Part discusses a diverse group of legal interpretive rules. As
described below,200 these rules include the rule that implied repeals
are disfavored, the rule of lenity, the rule governing the interpreta-
tion of preambles, the absurdity rule, the rule that terms with a
historical legal meaning may be interpreted in accord with that
meaning, the antisurplusage rule, the expressio unius rule, the rule
that the specification of particulars is the exclusion of generals, the
negative pregnant rule, the rule that unclear provisions should be
interpreted in accord with their purpose, the rule of intratextualism,
the rule that an interpreter should consider both the letter and the
spirit of a provision, the rule that the interpretation of a document
should accord with the nature of the document, the rule that
provisions should be interpreted in accord with legal maxims—such
as no man should benefit from his own wrong—and various other
rules. Some of these rules are legal interpretive rules, such as
expressio unius,201 but they might also be applied to some formal
documents that are not legal. But many others, like the rule of
lenity, would clearly not be applied to a nonlegal document.202
Taken together the evidence presented in this Part makes an
overwhelming case that the U.S. Constitution is written in the lan-
guage of the law.
A. The Self-Declaration
 The text of the Constitution provides the most obvious argument
for its legal nature. In the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution
defines itself as the “supreme Law of the Land.”203 The status of the
Constitution as law was not simply left to implication by the
enactors, but was explicitly set forth within the Constitution itself.
Thus, the text of the Constitution creates a strong presumption that
the enactors understood it as a document written in legal language,
to be interpreted using the rules applied to contemporary legal
documents of its kind. It is possible that the presumption could be
defeated if the document otherwise suggested that it was intended
to have legal effects but was not written in legal language. But other
200. See infra Parts III.E-F.
201. See Scott, supra note 91, at 351.
202. See id. at 389 n.267.
203. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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evidence negates this possibility and instead confirms the presump-
tion.
B. The Language of the Constitution
The Constitution is full of legal terms. As we have argued, it is
extremely difficult to account for legal terms under the ordinary-
language view of the Constitution. Thus, the presence of numerous
legal terms strongly supports the language-of-the-law view. Indeed,
it turns out that the Constitution contains many more legal terms
than most people may have imagined. In this Section, we categorize
and count the legal and potentially legal terms in the Constitution.
Others may, of course, disagree with some of our particular categor-
izations. Our purpose here is not to create a definitive list of terms
in these categories, but to show that, on any fair estimate, these
terms are far too numerous to fit with an ordinary-language view of
the Constitution.
Analyzing the number of legal terms in the Constitution requires
distinguishing between several groups of terms. The first group
consists of unambiguously legal terms. These terms have a legal
meaning but no ordinary meaning, and in most cases that legal
meaning would be unknown to most nonlawyers. For example, the
term “Letters of Marque and Reprisal”204 has a legal meaning but
does not have an ordinary language meaning.205 Similarly, the term
“Bill of Attainder”206 has a legal meaning, but no ordinary mean-
ing.207 Other terms in this category include “Writs of Election,”208
“President pro tempore,”209 “Writ of Habeas Corpus,”210 “high Crimes
and Misdemeanors,”211 “original Jurisdiction,”212 “appellate Jurisdic-
204. Id. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
205. See Solum, supra note 184, at 54.
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
207. See Solum, supra note 184, at 52 n.162. Some nonlawyers may know the term “bill of
attainder,” but that understanding does not imply that it is an ordinary language term. After
all, knowledgeable nonlawyers may have knowledge of some legal terms. Deciding whether
such a term is an ordinary language term might require comparing the rate of knowledge of
a term among lawyers and nonlawyers.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
209. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
210. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
211. Id. art. II, § 4.
212. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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tion,”213 “Attainder of Treason,”214 “Full Faith and Credit,”215 “Duty
of Tonnage,”216 “admiralty ... Jurisdiction,”217 and “maritime Juris-
diction.”218
A second group consists of ambiguous terms—terms that have
both a legal and a nonlegal meaning. For example, while the term
“Recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause had an ordinary lan-
guage meaning that suggested a break of any length, it also had a
legal meaning that referred to a break between two legislative
sessions.219 In addition, while the term “good Behaviour” had an
ordinary language meaning, it also had a distinct legal meaning
applicable to judicial officers.220 Other terms in this category include
“Treason,”221 “declare War,”222 “War,”223 “receive Ambassadors,”224
“necessary and proper,”225 “Privileges,”226 “Immunities,”227 “executive
Power,”228 and “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”229
213. Id.
214. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
215. Id. art IV, § 1; see Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95
VA. L. REV. 1201, 1209 (2009) (“Understanding the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires an
understanding of the legal environment in which it was written.”).
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
217. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
218. Id.
219. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; see, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess
Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2005).
220. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to
Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 82-84 (2006).
221. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
222. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11; see, e.g., Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power
Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility, 34 VA.
J. INT ’L L. 903, 906-07 (1994).
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
224. Id. art. II, § 3.
225. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope
of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267,
286-89 (1993).
226. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO.
L.J. 1241, 1252-63 (2010).
227. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see also Lash, supra note 226, at 1252-63.
228. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; see, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and
the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 212 (1998).
229. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see, e.g., infra notes 279-87 and accompanying text. The other
ambiguous terms are “Impeachment,” “Indictment,” “ex post facto,” “Felony,” “Breach of the
Peace,” “be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
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These two groups of terms provide powerful evidence for the legal
character of the Constitution’s language. It is true that not all the
ambiguous terms will turn out to have been used with their legal
meaning. When an ambiguous term is employed, its meaning
ultimately depends on the context and the other legal interpretive
rules for resolving ambiguity—on considerations such as the
purpose of the provision, the type and structure of the document,
and how common the different meanings are.230 Thus, the number
of ambiguous terms helps determine the maximum number of legal
meanings that might have been employed, not the actual number.
Still, the number of ambiguous terms is an important consider-
ation in determining the language used in the document. First, the
number of ambiguous terms provides a window into the number of
terms that will turn out to have legal meanings once the involved
task of interpreting the document is completed. While it would be
laborious to interpret all the ambiguous terms, it is likely that a
significant number of these ambiguous terms are properly inter-
preted to have legal meanings in the Constitution. For example, the
term “good behavior,” discussed above, is certain to have its legal
meaning in the Constitution.231 Similarly, the term “Jury”232 is likely
to have been employed with its technical meaning of a body of
twelve people, rather than the ordinary meaning of an indetermi-
nate number of people.
Second, a legally knowledgeable reader of the document at the
time of its enactment would not be able to know for certain which
meaning all these terms had. That assessment would require
interpreting them all in context. Such a reader, however, would still
make the judgment that this evidence of ambiguous terms sup-
ported the conclusion that the document was written in the
language of the law, because he would believe that a substantial
percentage of these terms would ultimately receive their legal
meaning. Put differently, even if it is not possible for a reader to
Houses,” “Treaty,” “Reprieves,” “Pardons,” “Bribery,” “Jury,” “Forfeiture,” “jurisdiction of the
crime,” “Piracies,” “Bills of Credit,” “Imposts,” “Excises,” “Law of Nations,” “Captures,” “raise
and support,” “Cession,” “Capitation,” “Alliance,” “Confederation,” “Compact,” “Ambassadors,”
“Public Ministers,” “Consuls,” “commission,” “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”
“Controversies,” and “in law” and “in ... Equity.” U.S. CONST. arts. I-IV.
230. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 91, at 362.
231. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
232. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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determine the exact number of terms that have a legal meaning in
the Constitution, the number of ambiguously legal terms would help
confirm that the Constitution was written in legal language.
Our review of the Constitution found a substantial number of
terms falling into these two groups. We have tentatively classified
thirteen terms as being unambiguously legal.233 This is too large a
number to dismiss these terms as isolated or aberrational examples
of legal terms.
We have also found that another forty-four terms are ambiguous,
having both an ordinary and legal meaning.234 This is a large
number. In addition, it is not always evident whether a term clearly
has only a legal meaning, or whether it is ambiguous because it also
has an ordinary meaning.235 For example, the term “overt [a]ct”236 is
clearly a legal term, but it is hard to know whether it has an
ordinary meaning. We are more inclined to believe it is not used in
ordinary language, except in a legal context, but we are not certain.
Thus, we classify it as on the border. Similarly, we are not sure
whether the term “Corruption of Blood”237 had only a legal meaning
or also an ordinary meaning. In addition to these two terms, we
found an additional three terms in this group of terms that are
unclear whether they have only a single legal meaning or also an
ordinary meaning: “Prejudice any Claims of the United States”238
and “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States,”239
and “direct Taxes.”240
Overall, we found numerous terms—sixty-two—to have at least
a legal meaning.241 The Constitution is a short document. The ordin-
ary-language view cannot account for this result.
233. See supra notes 204-18 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 219-29 and accompanying text.
235. See Mattila, supra note 64, at 31.
236. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
237. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
238. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
239. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. As we have said, “privileges” and “immunities” seem clearly to
have an ordinary meaning as well as a legal meaning when each word is considered
individually. Here we consider the question of whether the longer phrase is written in the
language of the law.
240. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
241. That is, either to be unambiguously legal, to be ambiguous between an ordinary and
legal meaning, or to have a legal meaning and to be unclear as to whether it also has an
ordinary meaning.
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This initial assessment understates the actual number of legal
terms. The numbers given so far merely count the separate terms
in the Constitution with a legal meaning. The Constitution uses
many of these terms more than once. The repetition of these terms
is relevant. If a document uses three legal terms once each, it has a
less legal character than a document that uses three legal terms five
times each. The fifteen legal terms in the latter document greatly
magnify the legal impression. With the repetitions of legal terms,
the Constitution has 103 terms with a legal meaning.242
Even this more extended assessment is an understatement. So
far, we have included only terms certain to have at least one legal
meaning. But the Constitution contains many terms about which it
is difficult to know for sure, without significant research, whether
they have a legal meaning in addition to the ordinary meaning.
Thus, another relevant group of terms are those that clearly have
an ordinary meaning but might or might not have a legal meaning.
Including this group might seem unnecessary, if it only comprised
terms which had the mere possibility of having a legal meaning. But
we include only terms that have some significant chance of having
a legal meaning. For example, the terms “legislative Powers,”243
“Citizen of the United States,”244 “natural born Citizen,”245 “inferior
Courts,”246 “the Recess of the Legislature of any State,”247 “the Rules
of [a legislative house’s] Proceedings,”248 “Tender in Payment of
Debts,”249 “inspection Laws,”250 “Speech or Debate,”251 “Commander
in Chief,”252 and “Office of honor, Trust or Profit,”253 possibly have a
legal meaning in addition to their ordinary meaning. It turns out
that numerous terms fit into this group. Adding this last group
242. In the first group of clearly unambiguously legal terms, the thirteen terms are used
fifteen times. In the second group of ambiguous legal terms, the forty-four terms are used
eighty-two times. The borderline group of five terms is used six times.
243. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
244. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
245. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
246. Id. art. III, § 1.
247. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
248. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
249. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
250. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
251. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
252. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
253. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
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expands the number of terms in the Constitution that potentially
have a legal meaning. If repetitions are counted, the Constitution
uses 139 terms that might have one legal meaning.254
These various groups produce an extremely large number: the
Constitution contains 242 terms with at least a possible legal mean-
ing. Of course, that number needs to be discounted by the possibility
that some of these terms will turn out not to have an alternative
legal meaning, and that others with alternative legal meanings will
not have that legal meaning in the document. Still, even taking
those discounts into account, it would be surprising if the number
of words with applicable legal meanings fell below one hundred.
Regardless of their exact number, their abundance constitutes
extremely strong evidence in favor of the language-of-the-law view.
One possible objection is that the ambiguous terms in the
Constitution do not put the ordinary language reader on notice of
the legal character of the document. According to this view, because
the ordinary language reader does not know about the legal
meaning of ambiguous terms, she will simply assume that they have
only an ordinary meaning, and will therefore fail to recognize that
the document contains legal terms. As we have noted, however, the
language in which a document is written is best determined by
people who are familiar with both the relevant languages. The
relative ignorance of readers who do not know the language of the
law is largely irrelevant.
But, as we have also argued, the Constitution would be unlikely
to fool people who lack knowledge of the language of the law into
believing it is written in ordinary language. The Constitution states
that it is a legal document and many terms in the document are
unambiguously legal. Even if these features would not prove to a lay
reader that the Constitution is written in the language of the law,
it would show that this language is a strong possibility.
Particularly in that context, even ambiguous terms strengthen
the notice to the ordinary language reader that the document might
be written in the language of the law. Consider the following appar-
254. Based on our review, sixty-nine separate terms might have one legal meaning. When
all instances of the term are included, this number increases to 139. See John O. McGinnis
& Michael B. Rappaport, List of Constitutional Legal Terms (unpublished list on file with
authors).
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ently ambiguous terms from the Constitution: “Impeachment,”255
“Quorum,”256 “Imposts,”257 “Breach of the Peace,”258 “Cession,”259
“Jurisdiction of the Crime,”260 “Felony,”261 and “Captures.”262 An
ordinary reader would be aware that all these terms involve legal
matters and are not frequently used in ordinary language. When an
ordinary language reader encounters a document like the Constitu-
tion, with so many such terms, the reader is likely to recognize that
these terms might have a legal meaning that he does not fully
understand.
In this Section we have considered only terms in the original
Constitution, not those in the Bill of Rights. But the Bill of Rights
also contains numerous technical, legal terms. Prominent examples
include: “establishment of religion,”263 “abridging the freedom of
speech,”264 “keep and bear Arms,”265 “probable cause,”266 “War-
rants,”267 “due process,”268 “right ... to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him,”269 and “cruel and unusual punishments.”270
Like the language of the original Constitution, the language of the
law in the Bill of Rights thus encompasses terms that are unambig-
uously legal, such as warrants,271 terms that are ambiguous between
ordinary meaning and the language of the law, such as “abridging
the freedom of speech,”272 and terms that may seem to be written in
ordinary language but turn out not to be, such as cruel and unusual
punishment.273 And as we will discuss, the Ninth Amendment
255. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
256. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
257. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
258. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
259. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
260. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
261. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
262. Id. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
263. Id. amend. I.
264. Id.
265. Id. amend. II.
266. Id. amend. IV.
267. Id.
268. Id. amend. V.
269. Id. amend. VI.
270. Id. amend. VIII.
271. See id. amend. IV.
272. Id. amend. I.
273. See id. amend. VIII.
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appears to presuppose legal interpretive rules.274 In fact, the Bill of
Rights may even more strongly support the language-of-the-law
view, since it appears to include a higher ratio of legal language to
ordinary language than the original Constitution.
We will have occasion to discuss some of these legal terms in our
Section on the centrality of the language of the law to modern orig-
inalist scholarship and jurisprudence.275 While it would be laborious
to go through the same detailed analysis of the legal terms in the
Bill of Rights that we have undertaken as to the original Constitu-
tion, it is clear that Congress’s decision to write down the people’s
rights in the language of the law provides additional support for the
view that the Constitution is written in that language.
C. The Nature and Structure of the Document
The structure of the Constitution underscores its legal nature.
The Constitution consists largely of procedures and enumerated
powers. A document setting forth the powers of various actors has
a strong family resemblance to many other documents written in
the language of the law—from a power of attorney, to a conveyance
of portions of real property, to a corporate charter.276 Thus, the very
substance of the document suggests its legal nature.
The Constitution was more complex than these documents, but
observers at the time recognized that this complexity itself required
specialized knowledge and methods. As St. George Tucker wrote,
“science, only, is equal to the task” of making sense of the complex-
ity of our constitutional system of government.277
It was also recognized that the legal science applied to the
Constitution depended on understanding the document against
principles to be found in other laws:
[T]he study of the constitution is not more necessary to the right
understanding of the force and obligation of any positive law,
274. See infra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
275. See infra Part IV.C.
276. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
277. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA xv (1803).
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than the study of the law, as a science, is to a full and perfect
understanding of the constitution: for the rules of law must not
unfrequently be consulted, to explain the principles contained in
the constitution: thus, they mutually contribute to the due
investigation and understanding of each other.278
Thus, the Constitution announces that it is written in the language
of the law through its extensive use of legal terms and its references
to other bodies of law. Its family resemblance to other legal docu-
ments also indicates that it is written in the legal language. And its
greater complexity than those documents suggested to contempo-
rary observers that it was to be interpreted against a complex body
of preexisting rules.
D. The Explicit and Implicit References to Legal Interpretive Rules
Some of the strongest evidence that the Constitution was written
in the language of the law lies in provisions showing that the
enactors believed it would be interpreted according to legal interpre-
tive rules. The Constitution contains specific clauses that block the
application of legal interpretive rules that would otherwise apply.
It also contains other clauses that invite the application of legal
interpretive rules. These clauses were governed by legal interpretive
rules and would not characteristically appear in documents written
in ordinary language.
1. Clauses Blocking the Application of Legal Interpretive Rules
The Supremacy Clause contains a provision that blocks the
application of a legal interpretive rule—the rule against implied
repeals—that might otherwise have been applicable.279 After stating
that the Constitution and other federal law is the supreme law of
the land, the Clause provides: “[A]ny Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”280 Caleb Nelson
278. Id. at xvii. For further reading on the importance of Tucker, see G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 82 (1988).
279. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
280. Id.
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recently explained the reason for the appearance of this phrase,
which is called the “non obstante” clause.281
The Supremacy Clause, of course, gives the Constitution, stat-
utes, and treaties priority over inconsistent state law.282 But it
might be debated how much inconsistency was needed between the
state and federal laws for the federal law to displace a state law. For
that question there was a potentially relevant preexisting common
law rule that spoke to the amount of inconsistency required. Under
the common law, implied repeals were extremely disfavored. Thus,
the inconsistency would have to be glaring for the second law to be
interpreted as displacing the prior law.283
Otherwise, the common law directed the interpreter to reconcile
the two laws.284 When legislators did not desire this harmonization,
they added a legal term of art—the “non obstante” phrase—to
negate the operation of the common law rule against implied
repeals.285 The rule against implied repeals is not an ordinary
language rule, but an interpretive rule about how to construe two
laws—a quintessential legal interpretive rule.286
Under the common law regime that preceded the Constitution, an
interpreter might well have understood the Supremacy Clause to be
triggered only if the previous state laws in tension were absolutely
contradictory to the subsequent federal ones. The non obstante
clause in the Supremacy Clause was deemed necessary as a guide
to judges precisely because the enactors understood that the
Constitution would be interpreted against the background of
preexisting legal rules.287
The non obstante clause did not merely show that the Framers
believed that legal interpretive rules would apply to the Constitu-
tion. It also showed that the specific language of this clause could
not be understood without recognizing that it was invoking a legal
interpretive rule that would prevent the operation of another legal
281. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 241-42, 246-48 (2000).
282. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
283. See Nelson, supra note 281, at 241-42.
284. See id. at 292.
285. See id. at 294.
286. See id. at 241-42.
287. See id. at 232.
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interpretive rule.288 The clause is a clear indication that the Con-
stitution is written in the language of the law.
The Ninth Amendment also reflects the understanding that the
Constitution was written in the language of the law and would be
interpreted according to legal interpretive rules. The Amendment
provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”289 While there is disagreement about what the Ninth
Amendment means, “everyone agrees that it focuses primarily on
forbidding an interpretive inference: inferring from the enumeration
of [certain] rights that the people do not enjoy other rights” not so
enumerated.290
One inference would have been based on the anti-surplusage rule:
enumeration might lead an interpreter to conclude that Congress
actually possessed the regulatory power that the listed right
blocked.291 For example, in opposing the Bill of Rights, Alexander
Hamilton noted that if the right to freedom of the press were
included, even though Congress did not have an enumerated power
to regulate the press, that inclusion might lead an interpreter to
conclude that Congress actually possessed that regulatory power.292
A second fear was that interpreters would assume that a listing of
rights meant that unlisted rights were not protected. This inference
would have been based on another interpretive rule—expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.293 Accordingly, the two leading ap-
proaches to the Ninth Amendment assume the Constitution was
written in the language of the law with legal interpretive rules in
the background.
288. See id.
289. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
290. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 127.
291. See id.
292. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
293. See id. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “[t]he expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another.” Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.
1999).
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2. Clauses Calling for the Application of Legal Interpretive
Rules
A preamble and prefatory clauses also appear in the Constitution
and invite the application of legal rules. The preamble runs:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.294
The preamble of the Constitution is not the kind of opening that
generally appears in documents written in ordinary language. Its
presence also raises questions about its relation to the remainder of
the document. A contemporary legal interpretive rule provided that
a preamble stated the purpose of a document, and thereby clarified
ambiguities in its language. As explained by Joseph Story in his
commentaries:
[The Preamble’s] true office is to expound the nature and extent,
and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitu-
tion, and not substantively to create them.... [S]uppose the terms
of a given power admit of two constructions, the one more
restrictive, the other more liberal, and each of them is consistent
with the words, but is, and ought to be, governed by the intent
of the power; if one would promote, and the other defeat ... ought
not the former, upon the soundest principles of interpretation to
be adopted?295
Story is here stating the traditional rule outlined by Blackstone for
the use of preambles: that they may be used to resolve ambiguities
but not to add or subtract from the clear meaning of the operative
294. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
295. STORY, supra note 103, § 462.
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phrases in the rest of the document.296 Case law around the time of
the Constitution reflected that view as well.297
It appears that a similar rule applied to prefatory clauses, such
as the Second Amendment language providing “[a] well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State.”298 While law-
yers at the time did not use the phrase “prefatory clause,” the pre-
amble rule would likely have applied to prefatory clauses. First, as
Blackstone makes clear, the rule on preambles is a specific instance
of the way the verbal context surrounding a specific phrase should
be treated,299 and prefatory clauses provide a context resembling
preambles. Second, a prefatory clause is essentially a preamble to
a sentence. Cases discussing preambles contrast them with the
“enacting clause[s]” of a statute.300 This contrast suggests that
preambles and prefatory clauses would be given similar interpretive
effect, because prefatory clauses, like preambles, offer general sen-
timents in advance of the operative language of an enactment.
Accordingly, the preamble and prefatory clauses offer language
whose purport was understood through legal interpretive rules.
Indeed, in District of Columbia v. Heller Justice Antonin Scalia
appealed to his understanding of the role of prefatory clauses to help
settle the meaning of the Second Amendment.301 One argument
against finding an individual right to bear arms is that the prefa-
tory clause’s focus on the militia limits that right to bearing arms in
connection with a militia. But Scalia found that the relevant canon
of interpretation at the time posited that a prefatory clause could
clarify an ambiguity, but could not otherwise limit or expand the
296. See TUCKER, supra note 277, at 59 (noting that in cases of ambiguity “the proeme, or
preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of parliament”).
297. See, e.g., Brett v. Brett, (1826) 162 Eng. Rep. 456, 458-59 (“It is to the preamble more
especially that we ... look for the reason or spirit of every statute; rehearsing this, as it
ordinarily does, ... in the best and most satisfactory manner, the object or intention of the
legislature.”). For a more general discussion of different views of the appropriate legal
interpretive rule applied to a preamble, see David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment
Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions
in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295, 1307-25 (2009).
298. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
299. See TUCKER, supra note 277, at 59 (“If words happen to be still dubious, we may
establish their meaning from the context.”).
300. See Brett, 162 Eng. Rep. at 460.
301. 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
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operative clause.302 Relying on the canon, he then held that the op-
erative clause—the right of the people to keep and bear arms—was
unambiguous and therefore could not be limited by the militia
preamble.303
Thus, the constitutional text both blocks the operation of certain
legal interpretive rules and contains clauses that call for the ap-
plication of legal interpretive rules. Both kinds of provisions sup-
plement the already strong evidence of the Constitution’s legal
language—from its self-declaration, language, and structure.
E. The Interpretive Practices of Early Jurists
The practices of judges and justices in the early Republic confirm
that state constitutions and the Federal Constitution were under-
stood to be written in the language of the law and to be interpreted
by using legal interpretive rules. Even before the Federal Constitu-
tion, state constitutions used legal methods of interpretation that
would have been unlikely to be familiar to the lay public. Both the
pre-Marshall and the Marshall Courts applied interpretive rules to
cash out the meaning of difficult-to-interpret phrases in the
Constitution. The applied interpretive rules, moreover, went beyond
the regularities of ordinary language, to the use of legal interpretive
rules directing interpreters to the legal background or purpose of
the provision, or spirit of the entire document.
1. Early State Courts
The Federal Constitution was not the first such instrument to be
enacted in the early Republic. Eleven of the thirteen states wrote
their own constitutions.304 Some of the early cases rendering deci-
sions under them show that these constitutions were regarded as
written in the language of the law, setting a precedent for how the
Federal Constitution would be understood.
302. See id. at 578.
303. See id. at 579-81.
304. See Mark A. Graber, State Constitutions as National Constitutions, 69 ARK. L. REV.
371, 373 (2016).
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In Holmes v. Watson, one of the earliest cases of judicial review,
the issue concerned what constituted a jury.305 The New Jersey
Supreme Court struck down a state statute that provided that the
trial to determine whether property was loyalist property and thus
subject to seizure was to be by a “jury of six men.”306 The Constitu-
tion guaranteed a right to jury trial, but did not specify the number
of people on the requisite jury.307 Nevertheless, the court objected to
the constitutionality of the statute, even though it would have
appeared to comply with the ordinary language meaning of the term
jury. While we do not have the text of the opinion, it appears the
court appealed to historical legal understandings in the law that
specified twelve as the appropriate number of jurors. As William
Treanor observes:
The requirement that a jury consist of twelve persons was
presumably derived from English common law or colonial-era
documents. In particular, foundational documents for the two
parts of New Jersey—the West Jersey Concessions and Agree-
ments of 1676 and the East Jersey House of Representatives’
1699 Declaration of Rights and Privileges—provided that trials
shall be by “twelve honest men of the neighborhood” and “by the
verdict of twelve men,” respectively.308
Thus, while the term jury could have been read colloquially as en-
compassing a body of lay decision makers of indeterminate size, the
Holmes court interpreted it to have a legal meaning based on a legal
reference.309
In Commonwealth v. Caton, judges in a series of opinions and
lawyers in a variety of arguments showed that they believed that
the Virginia Constitution was written in the language of the law,
and that legal interpretive rules were needed to resolve ambigu-
ities.310 In Caton, three prisoners prosecuted by the Commonwealth
305. While there was no opinion in Holmes v. Watson, a case decided in 1780, the holding
of the case was discussed in State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427, 444 (1802).
306. See id.
307. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
308. William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 475
(2005) (footnote omitted).
309. See id.
310. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
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of Virginia for treason relied on a resolution of the Virginia House
of Delegates that pardoned them to try to avoid execution.311 But the
Senate had not concurred, and a previously passed statute stated
that a pardon could not be provided by the governor alone, but
required a resolution of both the House and Senate.312 A provision
of the constitution, however, arguably gave the House of Delegates
alone the power to pardon.313
Judge George Wythe concluded that the statute barring the
pardon by the House of Delegates was constitutional for two
separate reasons, both of which employed legal interpretive rules.
First, he argued that the last clause of the constitutional provision
that arguably gave the House this power (“in which cases, no
reprieve, or pardon, shall be granted, but by resolve of the house of
delegates”) applied only to impeachments carried out by the House
of Delegates.314 He read the clause in this manner because it re-
flected the historical contest between the Crown and Parliament in
England, where Parliament did not want subjects of impeachments
pardoned by the King.315 Thus, like the judges in Holmes, he used
the legal background of a provision to disambiguate it.
But even if the last clause of the constitutional provision were
relevant to the case, Judge Wythe rejected the House’s unilateral
pardon power. He held that the word “resolve” in that clause should
be understood to require the concurrence of the Senate. First, he
noted an ambiguity in the word “resolve” in the Virginia Constitu-
tion: it could mean either a resolution of the House of Delegates only
or of both the Senate and House.316 He then dissolved the ambiguity
by referring to the general background principle of bicameralism,
reflecting a rule that an ambiguity in the constitution could be
resolved in light of its structure and its more general intent.317
311. See id. at 5.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 9.
314. See id. at 9-11.
315. See id. at 10.
316. See id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
317. See id. (“Because a word of equivocal signification, ought to be understood according
to that sense, which is conformable to the general scope of the instrument; for the general
scope manifests the particular intent of those, who used it.”). In this case the intent was to
make sure that when the “vital interests of the community” were affected as in prosecution
of crime, both houses of the legislature have to negate the conviction through a pardon. Id.
at 10.
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Judge Edward Pendleton discovered a similar ambiguity in the
Virginia Constitution, stating that the constitution could either
mean that the House of Delegates’s power to pardon was limited to
impeachment or extended to all offenses.318 Judge Pendleton
preferred “the first [meaning], as most congenial to the spirit, and
not inconsistent with the letter, of the constitution.”319 The “spirit”
here was derived from the constitution’s consistent concern with
abuse of the pardon power, abuses being more likely when power is
lodged in a single institution.320
Some of the lawyers in the case also employed interpretive rules,
showing that the professional community understood the Virginia
Constitution to be written in the language of the law. For example,
Andrew Ronald, attorney for the prisoners, argued that a House
pardon was effective under the constitutional provision.321 But he
also contended that even if the Constitution were ambiguous, a rule
of lenity should apply: “[T]he construction ought, in favour of life, to
incline to the side of mercy.”322 Edmund Randolph and St. George
Tucker also employed legal interpretive rules in their arguments to
the court.323 
In Kamper v. Hawkins, two judges also employed legal interpre-
tive rules.324 In Kamper, the Virginia legislature had not followed
the appointment method and other specified requirements in the
Virginia Constitution for creating a district court.325 Judge Spencer
Roane held that the statute was unconstitutional because it was “in
318. See id. at 19.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 18-19.
321. See id. at 7.
322. See id.
323. See 3 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LAW REPORTS AND SELECTED PAPERS 1782-1825, at 1741,
1742-46 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 2013) (amicus brief by St. George Tucker relying on both the
“Spirit of [the] Constitution” and the more general structure of reservation of privileges to
resolve any ambiguity in the Constitution in favor of the prisoners); Letter from Edmund
Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), reprinted in 5 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
262, 263 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1967) (Randolph stated that his
argument, that the legislature could mandate the concurrence of the Senate, depended on
legal understandings and “to any but lawyers ... would appear unintelligible”); Treanor, supra
note 308, at 490-91.
324. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
325. See id. at 22-23.
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opposition to the fundamental principles” of the constitution.326 He
wrote:
By fundamental principles I understand, those great principles
growing out of the Constitution, by the aid of which, in dubious
cases, the Constitution may be explained and preserved invio-
late; those land-marks, which it may be necessary to resort to,
on account of the impossibility to foresee or provide for cases
within the spirit, but without the letter of the Constitution.327
Judge Roane’s distinction between the spirit and the letter followed
a common interpretive rule at the time. The reference to “the letter”
reflected the manner of interpreting a clause by reference to its
text.328 The reference to “the spirit” reflected the resolution of text-
ual ambiguity by reference to the purpose, structure, or intent of a
document or clause.329
Judge Tucker’s opinion also employed a similar interpretive rule
to hold the statute unconstitutional. Judge Tucker held the provi-
sion unconstitutional, emphasizing “the spirit of our government”
as well as the text of the constitution.330 Elsewhere, Tucker also
applied an anti-surplusage rule.331
2. The Pre-Marshall Court
Even before the advent of Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme
Court employed interpretive rules to resolve the meaning of the
newly enacted Constitution. Chisholm v. Georgia may be the most
famous case from the pre-Marshall Court.332 There the question was
whether the Constitution permitted citizens of one state to sue
another state in federal court, even if the state claimed sovereign
326. See id. at 35-36 (Roane, J.).
327. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
328. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 84-85 (2006).
329. See id. at 85.
330. See Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 68 (Tucker, J.).
331. See id. at 88 n.d1 (“Since every word in that instrument, the constitution of the
commonwealth, should be construed to have its effect; a rule applied to all written
instruments whatsoever, and more peculiarly applicable, I should presume, to that which
expresses the collective, and sovereign will and intention of the people.”).
332. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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immunity from the lawsuit.333 The Court, in a 4-1 decision, held that
private citizens could maintain these suits.334 The most relevant
language in the Constitution appears in Article III’s grant of federal
court jurisdiction for “[c]ontroversies ... between a State and Citi-
zens of another State.”335
Despite this language, some jurists thought that sovereign
immunity precluded the suit.336 The argument depended on a
venerable rule of interpretation that delegations of sovereign power
should be strictly construed—a rule that goes back at least to the
middle of the eighteenth century.337 Justice James Iredell agreed
with this view. While his dissenting opinion in Chisolm focused on
the statutory issue, Justice Iredell also drafted a dissent that he did
not issue that employed the legal interpretive rule of strict construc-
tion against the delegation of sovereign powers.338
At least one of the seriatim opinions for the majority in Chisolm
also deployed legal interpretive rules. Chief Justice John Jay
rejected the claim that the language of Article III should be
interpreted to include states only as plaintiffs but not defendants to
honor the principle of sovereign immunity.339 He argued that “[t]he
ordinary rules for construction will easily decide whether those
words are to be understood in that limited sense.”340 There were two
such relevant rules. One was that remedial rules should be con-
strued liberally, which Chief Justice Jay thought applied to Article
III, because he considered it “remedial.”341 The second was to
construe the provision in accord with the preamble, using the
333. See id. at 469 (Jay, C.J.).
334. See id. at 479.
335. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
336. See Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Nathaniel Pendleton (May 21, 1792), reprinted
in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800,
at 157, 157-58 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994).
337. As articulated by the famous jurist Emer de Vattel. See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 9 (Joseph Chitty ed., new ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson &
Co. 1863) (1758).
338. See generally James Iredell’s Supreme Court Opinion (Feb. 18, 1793), reprinted in 5
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra
note 336, at 164.
339. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 473, 476 (Jay, C.J.).
340. Id. at 476.
341. See id. at 476-77.
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language of the preamble to function as Joseph Story argued it
should function—not to provide independent provisions of positive
law, but principles for resolving ambiguities.342 Chief Justice Jay
stated that because the preamble made clear that the Constitution
is to establish justice, the provision should be read in accord with
republican equality, allowing states to both sue and be sued.343 
3. The Marshall Court
Many of the most important cases in the Marshall Court con-
cerned legal interpretive rules. McCulloch v. Maryland, for instance,
turned on a battle among different interpretive rules rooted in the
nature of the Constitution.344 For instance, the eminent lawyer St.
George Tucker argued that the Constitution was a compact of the
sovereign states.345 This characterization of the union allowed them
to employ the traditional common law interpretive rule, discussed
above, that grants of powers by a sovereign should be narrowly
construed. This rule formed the legal basis for Maryland’s argument
that the enumerated powers should be strictly construed.346
Chief Justice Marshall rejected this argument, not because he
rejected legal interpretive rules, but because he disagreed with
Maryland’s characterization of the Constitution and the interpretive
rules drawn from it. For Marshall, the Constitution was not a
compact among the states, but a delegation of power by the national
people to their representatives.347 Thus, Marshall argued for his own
interpretive rule—that strict construction is incompatible with the
nature of the Constitution—based on a different understanding of
the document.
In other cases, Chief Justice Marshall employed common law in-
terpretive rules to reach his result. In Gibbons v. Ogden, he argued
342. See STORY, supra note 103, § 462 (discussing Story’s view of the preamble).
343. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 477 (Jay, C.J.).
344. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-01 (1819).
345. See TUCKER, supra note 277, app. at 151. For a discussion of the relation of compact
theory to strict construction, see generally Kurt T. Lash, “Tucker’s Rule”: St. George Tucker
and the Limited Construction of Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2006).
346. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403-04.
347. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation
of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1248-49 (1987).
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that, if it is unclear on its face whether commerce encompassed
navigation, one should resort to a clarifying legal interpretive rule:
If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be
serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a
well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, espe-
cially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself,
should have great influence in the construction. We know of no
reason for excluding this rule from the present case.348
Because Marshall believed it was clear that the national govern-
ment was to have power over vessels and seamen, he concluded that
the term “commerce” must be understood to include navigation.349
Moreover, Marshall’s assessment that such a power was an object
of the Constitution flowed from yet another interpretive rule:
It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that the excep-
tions from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as
well as useless, to except from a granted power, that which was
not granted—that which the words of the grant could not
comprehend. If, then, there are in the constitution plain excep-
tions from the power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the
exercise of that power in a particular way, it is a proof that those
who made these exceptions, and prescribed these inhibitions,
understood the power to which they applied as being granted.350
Given that the Constitution prohibited certain regulations of navi-
gation, Marshall concluded that the regulation of navigation must
be one of the objects of the Clause.351
Besides invoking the purpose of a provision, Marshall also applied
the venerable rule about consulting the spirit of the entire instru-
ment. As he put it in Sturges v. Crowninshield, “[A]lthough the
spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be re-
spected not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly
from its words.”352 He went on to provide a rule to describe a
348. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188-89 (1824).
349. See id. at 89-90.
350. Id. at 191.
351. See id.
352. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819).
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circumstance when interpretation would have to consider the spirit
beyond that which can be collected through the words: “Where
words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of an
instrument bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent unless
the natural and common import of words be varied, construction
becomes necessary, and a departure from the obvious meaning of
words is justifiable.”353 Thus, Marshall deployed yet another well-
established legal rule of interpretation.
Marshall also discussed the absurdity rule, which he alluded to,
but did not apply, in several opinions. For instance, in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward he held that a corporate charter
was a contract under the Contracts Clause.354 But he admitted that
even if something is within the literal scope of a provision, it may be
outside its legal meaning:
The case being within the words of the rule, must be within its
operation likewise, unless there be something in the literal
construction so obviously absurd, or mischievous, or repugnant
to the general spirit of the instrument, as to justify those who
expound the constitution in making it an exception.355
Marshall made similar reference to the absurdity rule in Sturges.356
In Marbury v. Madison, Marshall also used the rule against sur-
plusage to reject the capacity of Congress to add original jurisdiction
on the Court.357 In McCulloch, Marshall argued that “necessary” in
the Necessary and Proper Clause should not be read as strictly
necessary because the term necessary is qualified as absolutely
necessary elsewhere in the Constitution.358 Here he applied a
traditional canon of interpretation, now sometimes referred to as
353. Id.
354. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 592 (1819).
355. Id. at 644-45.
356. See Sturges, 17 U.S. at 202-03, (“But if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision,
not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because
we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in
which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so
monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.”).
357. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803).
358. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-14 (1819).
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intratextualism, that discovers meaning by comparing variations on
wording within the Constitution.359
Thus, the Great Chief Justice was the great interpreter of the
language of the law in the Constitution. Marshall deployed many
different kinds of interpretive rules, including rules that would be
applied only to legal documents, such as traditional common law
rules, and rules he gathered from the nature of the Constitution
itself.
F. The Interpretive Practices of the Framers and Early Legislators
It was not only judges who treated the Constitution as a docu-
ment written in the language of the law. Officials did so as well,
beginning with the Framers and extending into the early Con-
gresses. This evidence may be even more probative of the language
in which the Constitution was written. Politicians are not disci-
plined by a professional culture to resort to legal interpretive rules.
That they also understood the Constitution as a legal document is
more evidence of its legal nature.
1. The Framing
One of the best pieces of evidence that the Framers thought the
Constitution was written in the language of the law comes from the
Philadelphia Convention itself. The Convention had decided to bar
ex post facto laws, but was uncertain whether the prohibition
applied only to criminal laws or also to civil laws.360 The term means
“after the fact” in Latin, but has no literal object of reference in
ordinary English. To this day, the term is sometimes used in a
nontechnical sense simply to refer to retroactive laws. This leads to
some uncertainty or ambiguity. At the Convention, John Dickinson
resolved this ambiguity by reporting that Blackstone’s Commentar-
ies indicated that the term applied only to criminal laws, and thus
some other provision was necessary to prevent the retrospective
application of civil laws.361 This incident shows that the Framers
359. See Amar, supra note 82, at 748.
360. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 448-49 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS].
361. See id.; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *46.
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themselves understood that they were writing a document that
would be interpreted based on legal materials and language.362
After the Convention, the Framers continued to treat the Con-
stitution as written in the language of the law. Alexander Hamilton
provides an excellent example. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton
relied on a variety of legal rules. He applied to the Constitution the
rule that “[a] specification of particulars is an exclusion of generals”
and “[t]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”363 He
also employed “what lawyers call a negative pregnant,” involving an
interpretive rule that says the negation of one thing is the affirm-
ance of another, and the antisurplusage rule.364 Moreover, in his
famous opinion on the Bank of the United States, Hamilton as
Treasury Secretary was even more explicit about the importance of
the legal interpretive rules, stating that the “intention [of the Con-
stitution] is to be sought ... according to the usual [and] established
rules of construction.”365
During the ratification debates, even the opponents of the Con-
stitution understood that the Constitution would be construed as
having a legal meaning, even if they decried the fact. Brutus, per-
haps the most famous pamphleteer against the Constitution, stated
that Article III made clear that the courts were to give “the consti-
tution a legal construction, or to explain it according to the rules
laid down for construing a law.”366 He argued further that the objec-
tives of the preamble would have interpretive force in construing the
362. The debates at the state conventions were no different. In defending the notion that
treaties were the supreme law of the land, Madison referred to Blackstone’s Commentaries.
See The Debates in the Convention of the Common Wealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION
AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 500-01 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901) (remarks of James
Madison); see id. at 510 (remarks of Francis Corbin) (making the same point).
363. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
364. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 363, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton).
365. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank
(Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63, 111 (Harold C. Syrett
ed., 1965).
While one passage by Hamilton in the Federalist might be thought to militate against reli-
ance on legal interpretive rules, we explain that this interpretation is mistaken in other work.
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 768 n.66 (2009).
366. See Essays of Brutus No. XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 417, 419 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
1394 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1321
Constitution.367 The reason for his view was an interpretive rule: “It
is a rule in construing a law to consider the objects the legislature
had in view in passing it, and to give it such an explanation as to
promote their intention. The same rule will apply in explaining a
constitution.”368
At the Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry recognized
the legal nature of the Constitution’s language when he complained
that trial by jury was a technical term. He stated that he
had rather it had been left out altogether, than have it so vague-
ly and equivocally provided for. Poor people do not understand
technical terms—Their rights ought to be secured in language
of which they know the meaning. As they do not know the
meaning of such terms, they may be injured with impunity.369
2. Debates About the Constitution in the Early Congresses
The legislative debates in the early Republic also show that the
people at the time treated the Constitution as written in the lan-
guage of the law. The substantial majority of members of Congress
had no experience as jurists, yet they frequently resorted to legal
rules of interpretation to clarify the Constitution’s meaning. We
offer a synopsis of this evidence, discussing a debate over a specific
constitutional question—whether a senator can be impeached—and
providing a sampling of the many legal interpretive rules that early
members of the House and Senate employed.
The question of the scope of impeachment occasioned substantial
legal interpretation in Congress. The House had impeached William
Blount, a Senator, for allegedly conspiring with the British to seize
American territory.370 But questions existed about the propriety of
impeaching Blount. One question was whether senators were civil
officers of the United States subject to impeachment.371 Blount’s
367. See Essays of Brutus No. V, N.Y. J., Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 366, at 388, 388-89.
368. See id. at 389.
369. Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 10
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1421 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993).
370. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2246, 2339-401 (1798).
371. See id. at 2263, 2282.
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lawyers cited Blackstone and other authorities to explicate the legal
meaning of impeachment and define its scope.372 They invoked the
rule of lenity to suggest that any doubts about the scope of officials
subject to impeachment should be resolved in favor of the defen-
dant.373 They also argued from the legal maxim expressio unius that
the Constitution’s mention of a term denoting executive officers as
impeachable shows the legislators were excluded from the scope of
this proceeding.374 Another question was whether the fact that
Blount was no longer a senator, having been expelled, barred his
impeachment.375 House managers invoked the legal maxim that no
man should benefit from his own wrong to argue that the scope of
impeachment should not be narrowed to permit events subsequent
to Blount’s crime to defeat jurisdiction over impeachment.376
Traditional legal interpretive rules were also sprinkled through-
out other debates. These invocations were self-conscious acts. As
Congressman Pindall stated, “[W]e are accustomed to resort to the
law of nations; the maritime law, the common law of England, the
civil law, or some other unwritten law, or known rule of interpreta-
tion.”377 And the variety of rules of interpretation referenced was
quite wide. Some examples are expressio unius,378 the rule against
surplusage,379 the rule that all terms in a document should be given
the same meaning,380 the avoidance of absurd consequences,381 and
the purpose of a constitutional provision as a method for resolving
372. See id. at 2279-81.
373. See id. at 2281.
374. See id. at 2271.
375. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 278
(1997).
376. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2278.
377. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 918 (1818). Congressman Pindall was talking of “settling the
meaning” the Congress’s power to establish uniform rules of bankruptcy. See id.
378. See 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 1071-72 (1824) (remarks of Congressman McDuffie); 26
ANNALS OF CONG. 653 (1814) (remarks of Senator Gore); 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 775 (1802) (re-
marks of Congressman Griswold); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1968 (1798) (remarks of Congressman
Baldwin).
379. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1967-68 (remarks of Congressman Baldwin); id. at 1962
(remarks of Congressman Williams).
380. See 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 318 (1820) (remarks of Senator Barbour concerning intratext-
ualism).
381. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896-97 (1791) (remarks of Congressman Madison) (arguing
that reading the general welfare clause so elastically as to permit the Bank of the United
States, “would render nugatory the enumeration of particular powers”).
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ambiguity.382 Some rules were even more specific and detailed than
the foregoing, such as the rule that when one exception was made
expressly to a general grant of power, no other exception could be
implied.383
At other times, there were debates about which interpretive rule
was more relevant. For instance, the question arose whether
Congress could eliminate inferior courts once it had established
them. Senator Jackson appealed to rules about the powers of gran-
tors in deeds—that the first grant could not be modified by implica-
tion by a subsequent grant.384 Thus, he argued that the grant of
power to Congress to establish courts, which carried the incidental
power to eliminate them, could therefore not be limited by the
decision to give judges life tenure.385 Senator Chipman argued, in
contrast, that the rule about grantors was irrelevant to interpreting
the Constitution.386 The more relevant rule, he maintained, lay in
the requirement to give full meaning to every term in the Constitu-
tion, including “life tenure.”387 Congressional capacity to eliminate
the circuit courts would have deprived the term of its full function
in the document.388
G. Answers to Possible Objections
In this Section, we respond to possible objections to the view that
the Constitution is written in the language of the law rather than
ordinary language.
We first consider the claim that Chief Justice Marshall believed
that the Constitution should always be interpreted in accord with
ordinary language. We then reject Saul Cornell’s argument that the
Constitution is as legitimately interpreted in a popular as in a legal
mode.
382. See 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 319 (remarks of Senator Barbour); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946-
48 (remarks of Congressman Gerry).
383. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 130 (remarks of Senator Chipman).
384. See id. at 128 (remarks of Senator Jackson).
385. See id.
386. See id. (remarks of Senator Chipman).
387. See id. at 128-30.
388. See id.
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1. Marshall and Ordinary Language
Chief Justice Marshall is sometimes enlisted for the argument
that the Constitution is written in ordinary language. The passage
often used as evidence for this proposition comes from Gibbons: 
As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally
employ the words which most directly and aptly express the
ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed
our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be
understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and
to have intended what they have said.389
We think the quotation is weak support for the ordinary-language
hypothesis. The passage’s reference to “natural sense” could con-
ceivably be read to draw a contrast between ordinary meaning and
legal meaning. But it is better read to contrast the natural meaning
with the strict construction supported by the Jeffersonians. The
contrast between natural meaning and strict construction would
involve no presumption against the legal meaning, since the natural
meaning would often involve the legal understanding of the words.
We think that Marshall was referring to this contrast between
natural meaning and strict construction for two significant reasons.
First, it reflects the context of the quotation. Second, Marshall
himself often deployed many legal interpretive rules to determine
the legal meaning.
First, Marshall made this statement in the context of rejecting a
specific legal rule of the Jeffersonians—the Jeffersonian rule
against “strict construction” of Congress’s enumerated powers.390
One can understand Marshall’s assertion in Gibbons as claiming
that the natural as opposed to the constricted meaning should
control.391 Under this view, the natural meaning includes the usual
legal meaning of terms.
Second, as we have discussed above, Marshall often used legal in-
terpretive rules—rules that would not have been employed by most
citizens—to interpret the Constitution. For instance, he famously
389. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824).
390. See id.
391. Cf. id.
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stated that “we must never forget[ ] that it is a constitution we are
expounding.”392 Here he made clear that the category of the law
being interpreted makes a difference to its meaning. His endorse-
ment of the absurdity rule shows that he was willing to depart from
ordinary meaning.393 His embrace of consulting the objects and
spirit of constitutional provisions shows that he was willing to
supplement ordinary meaning.394 To be sure, Marshall, like other
jurists of the time, often made use of the ordinary meaning of the
text, but his decision to do so depended on the inapplicability of
other legal interpretive rules. 
2. Cornell and Popular Constitutionalism
Saul Cornell has argued that we are wrong not to accept that it
is as legitimate to interpret the Constitution as a popular document
as a legal one.395 His argument fails for two reasons. First, Cornell
does not show much, if any, evidence that contemporaries thought
the Constitution would be read as a popular document written in
392. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
393. See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 352-53 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia is also often thought to
have supported the view that the Constitution is written in ordinary rather than legal
language. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-77 (2008). But Scalia
himself regularly relied on the legal meanings of terms in the Constitution. See, e.g., Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (“[T]he ‘right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him,’ is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common
law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding. As the English
authorities above reveal, the common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent
witness’s examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” (first
quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI; then citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895);
and then citing State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 433-35 (1858))); see also Giles v. California, 554
U.S. 353, 358 (2008) (making a similar point).
The common law understanding of the right is, of course, the legal meaning of the Sixth
Amendment. One cannot assume that the ordinary reader understood that meaning;
therefore, Scalia seemed to contradict the view that he strongly preferred the ordinary
meaning. Indeed, as discussed above, see supra notes 301-03 and accompanying text, in Heller
Scalia appealed to the language of the law in the form of an interpretive rule to help settle the
meaning of the Second Amendment. Thus, Scalia’s practice was not to prefer the ordinary
meaning, but was instead consistent with the ordinary/technical language interpretive rule,
which resolves cases of ambiguity between ordinary and technical language terms based on
legal interpretive rules that look to factors such as purpose and structure.
395. See Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 300-
04 (2011).
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ordinary language. To be sure, he shows that some commentators
wanted a constitution written in ordinary language, but these citi-
zens opposed the Constitution in part because they felt it would be
read in the language of the law.
For instance, Cornell argues that Brutus wanted to confine
constitutional interpretation to the plain text. As he puts it, Brutus
“accepted the first of Blackstone’s rules, which enjoined judges to
read legal texts in light of the common use of words.”396 While
Cornell makes a persuasive case that Brutus favored law that was
written in ordinary language, that is not the language in which
Brutus thought the Constitution would be interpreted. He believed
the Constitution would be read with lawyer’s craft to consolidate
powers in the federal government.397 For that reason, he was an
opponent of both judicial review and the Constitution.
Cornell also suggests that an event in which a defendant made
arguments grounded in ordinary language to the popular institution
of the jury militates against understanding the Constitution as
written in ordinary language. In this incident, Eleazer Oswald
opposed a contempt citation from a judge for attempting to prejudice
a jury with out-of-court comments.398 Oswald made various “popular
arguments” against the charge, claiming that it should be decided
by a jury rather than a judge, and that it violated the freedom of the
press in the Pennsylvania Constitution, which he argued should be
interpreted in plain terms, not in the traditional legal terms that
may have limited the right.399
Cornell is undoubtedly correct that Oswald wanted to understand
the Pennsylvania Constitution in popular terms. But even if we
were to agree with Cornell’s assumption that this single incident is
representative of a more general view of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion’s language, this evidence does not show that the U.S. Consti-
tution is to be read in a similar vein. First, the Pennsylvania
Constitution is an uncertain guide to the U.S. Constitution. Many
have argued that the Pennsylvania Constitution broke most deci-
sively with traditions inherited from Britain, such as bicameralism,
396. Id. at 314.
397. Cornell himself seems to acknowledge this belief. See id. at 315-17.
398. See id. at 326-34.
399. Id. at 328-29.
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that were incorporated into the U.S. Constitution.400 Moreover,
while Oswald insisted on taking his legislative redress against the
judge who held him in contempt,401 the legislature rejected his
attempt.402 Thus, his views of how to interpret the Pennsylvania
Constitution coincided with neither the judiciary nor the popular
assembly. Finally, like more famous Antifederalists, he also opposed
the U.S. Constitution.403
The second reason Cornell’s argument fails is that, as we have
discussed above, the internal evidence, such as imbedded language
and references to technical rules, shows that the Constitution was
written in the language of the law. In other words, even if some
people claimed that the Constitution was written in wholly popular
language, they advanced an unreasonable hypothesis that did not
comport with this key evidence. Cornell does not discuss the lan-
guage of the Constitution, which is odd for one who demands a
“rigorous historical methodology” to determine the nature of the
document and the methods by which it should be read.404
IV. THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW AND MODERN ORIGINALISM
We end the Article by showing that the language of the law is an
essential component of the current practice of originalism. As
originalism has become more sophisticated both in legal scholarship
and on the Court, the language of the law has become central to
fixing the meaning of many of the Constitution’s provisions. The
turn to the language of the law should not be surprising. If the
Constitution is written in the language of the law, it is necessary to
read it in that language to render an accurate interpretation.
Moreover, legal language may give clear and precise answers where
ordinary language is imprecise or vague.
This originalist work employs key features of the language of the
law, such as using the legal meaning of terms that appear as
400. See, e.g., Robin West, Tom Paine’s Constitution, 89 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1420-21 (2003)
(discussing the populism of Pennsylvania’s Constitution).
401. See Cornell, supra note 395, at 330.
402. See Vernon O. Stumpf, Colonel Eleazer Oswald: Politician and Editor 285-309 (1968)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with authors).
403. See id. at 241-43.
404. See Cornell, supra note 395, at 296, 335.
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ordinary language to laypeople and deploying legal interpretive
rules. The ordinary-language view simply does not comport with
much of the best originalist work being done today. If modern orig-
inalism has a set of best practices, employing the language of the
law is one of them.
This Part discusses many examples of modern originalist
scholarship that employ the language of the law. We discuss the
foreign-affairs interpretation of executive power and then briefly
cover five other examples of originalist scholarship that use the
language of the law. We begin, however, with a discussion of one of
the most important areas of the originalist revival on the Supreme
Court—the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.
A. The Confrontation Clause
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Confrontation Clause
is a highpoint of originalism at the Court. In particular, the opinions
in Crawford v. Washington 405 and Giles v. California406 are two of
the most thorough recent investigations of original meaning in the
U.S. Reports. But these decisions are inconsistent with an ordinary-
language reading of the Constitution. The meaning of the Confron-
tation Clause, these opinions explicate, is a meaning found in the
language of the law—one that is constituted for this provision by a
set of common law rules.
The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.”407 In this Section, we consider how the
language of the law resolves three issues about the scope of the
Clause. The first is whether “witnesses” includes only those present
at trial or also extends to witnesses whose statements are intro-
duced at trial even if they are not themselves present. The second
question concerns the content of the Confrontation Clause right,
such as whether it includes the right of cross-examination. The third
question asks the extent to which the defendant can forfeit the right
by preventing the witness from testifying at trial.
405. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
406. 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
407. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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In Crawford, the state sought to introduce a tape-recorded
statement made to the police by the defendant’s wife.408 The state-
ment appeared reliable, but the defendant had not been afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.409 The Court, in an opin-
ion by Justice Scalia, recognized that the question of whether the
clause applies only to witnesses at trial is not answered by the
“Constitution’s text ... alone.”410 Justice Scalia stated that “[o]ne
could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to mean those
who actually testify at trial, those whose statements are offered at
trial, or something in-between.”411
To resolve this uncertainty, Justice Scalia looked at the legal
meaning of the constitutional provision. He argued that the “found-
ing generation’s immediate source of the concept” of the right to
confront one’s accusers “was the common law.”412 The common law
treated witnesses who testified outside the scope of trial as subject
to the right of confrontation.413 Indeed, the civil law abuses at which
the common law right of confrontation was aimed occurred largely
outside the context of trial.414 Thus, if the right to confront witnesses
were understood in ordinary language, the meaning of “witness”
would be at best ambiguous. But once its common law or legal
meaning was considered, its meaning became clear.415
The content of confrontation rights is also vague if the term
confrontation is viewed in ordinary language. But the Court instead
understood the term from the perspective of the language of the law,
considering its common law meaning to determine the precise
content of the right:
408. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
409. See id.
410. Id. at 42.
411. Id. at 42-43 (citations omitted).
412. Id. at 43.
413. See id. at 45.
414. See id. at 44-47.
415. The same focus on the common law right of confrontation led the Court to conclude
that the Clause only applies to testimonial statements—statements made under examination
or in other solemn ways. See id. at 51-52. The Court found that those kinds of statements
were the concern of the common law right of confrontation, not stray or casual remarks that
might be used against the accused. See id. at 51. Thus, the Court held that the concerns of the
Confrontation Clause are not coextensive with those of hearsay. See id. Some testimonial
statements may be admissible under hearsay doctrine, but must nevertheless be excluded.
See id.
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As the English authorities above reveal, the common law in 1791
conditioned admissibility of an absent witness’s examination on
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The
Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations. The
numerous early state decisions applying the same test confirm
that these principles were received as part of the common law in
this country.416
Once again, the language of the law gave clear meaning to a term
that would be vague if treated as written in ordinary language.
In Giles, the Court defined the circumstances in which the right
of confrontation can be forfeited.417 In that case, the defendant killed
the witness whose testimony was to be introduced without the
benefit of cross-examination.418 The Court again looked at the
common law and concluded that the defendant forfeited his right
only if he made the witness unavailable with the design of prevent-
ing the witness’s testimony.419 The Court was again clear that it was
bound by the legal meaning, not the ordinary meaning, of the
language: “[T]he Confrontation Clause is ‘most naturally read as a
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting
only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.’”420
Thus, the originalist jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause
cannot be accounted for by the ordinary-language view. It also
illustrates several important propositions about the language of the
law. The Court can choose the language of the law over ordinary
language when the terms at issue appear ambiguous as between
ordinary language and legal language. The Crawford Court’s
treatment of “witnesses” in the language of the law is an example of
such a reading.421 The Court can also read the language of the law
to find a meaning not present at all in ordinary language. The Giles
decision about when the right of confrontation is forfeited finds a
meaning in the Clause present only in the language of the law, not
in ordinary language.422 More generally, the jurisprudence of the
416. Id. at 54.
417. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2008).
418. See id. at 356.
419. See id. at 359-63.
420. See id. at 358 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54).
421. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43.
422. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 358.
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Confrontation Clause shows how the language of the law can con-
dense information in just a few words: it is both a shorthand that
allows for concision and a reference to prior rules that allows for
precision.423
B. The Executive Power Vesting Clause
One important area of originalist scholarship that relies on the
language-of-the-law view is the foreign-affairs interpretation of the
executive power. According to this interpretation, which has been
powerfully defended by Sai Prakash and Michael Ramsey, the
Executive Power Vesting Clause confers substantial foreign-affairs
authority on the President.424 Under the language-of-the-law view,
this interpretation provides a compelling originalist account of the
various powers the President enjoys, such as the power to communi-
cate with foreign governments and to announce the foreign policy of
the United States. By contrast, under the ordinary-language view,
this interpretation is much weaker and may not even be possible.
The foreign-affairs interpretation of executive power employs two
basic arguments that rely upon the language-of-the-law view. First,
the Constitution confers on the President, not simply the specifically
enumerated executive powers in Article II, but a residual executive
power provided by the Executive Power Vesting Clause.425 Under
this view, the powers understood to be executive at the time of the
Constitution were conferred on the President, except to the extent
that they were given to another branch, such as Congress, or were
limited, such as the power to make treaties with the advice and
423. Gary Lawson has suggested that Crawford and Giles may be wrong to focus on the
understanding of the Confrontation Clause at the time of the original Constitution. See
generally Gary Lawson, Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, the Judicial Method, and the
Adjudicative Limits of Originalism, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE: IN MEMORIAM: JUSTICE
ANTONIN SCALIA (1936-2016)) 2265 (2017). Given that Crawford and Giles were state cases,
the relevant question is the meaning of the Confrontation Clause as incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment. But even if Professor Lawson is correct, these cases show how the
Confrontation Clause as applied to the federal government requires a legal reading of the
Constitution. And it may well be the case that the meaning of the incorporated provision will
require consideration of the legal background of how the Clause was understood at the time
of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
424. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 252-53 (2001).
425. See id. at 253.
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consent of the Senate.426 Second, the relevant meaning of executive
power at the time included the foreign-affairs power.427
The first argument—that the Executive Power Vesting Clause
confers general executive powers that are not limited by the enum-
erated executive powers listed in Article II428—assumes a strong
textualist view of interpretation. The argument carefully compares
the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II. The Legislative Power
Vesting Clause provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”429 By contrast,
the Executive Power Vesting Clause provides that “[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”430
Comparing these clauses shows that Congress’s legislative powers
are limited by the listed powers in the Constitution, but the Presi-
dent’s are not.431 Instead, the President possesses powers deemed
executive that were not otherwise allocated by the Constitution.432
Much of the strength of this argument derives from the strong
textualism that it assumes. The argument is that the omission of
two words—“herein granted”—from the Executive Power Vesting
Clause had enormous consequences.433 Such a focus on these two
words fits comfortably with the language-of-the-law view. Lawyers
are known to take such details into account and to derive significant
consequences from them. They often employ a strong textualism.
But a strong textualist approach is open to powerful criticism if
one assumes that the Constitution is written in ordinary language.
Some opponents of the foreign-affairs interpretation question
whether the omission of two words can make so much difference.
For example, Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty argue that the in-
clusion of these words in the Legislative Power Vesting Clause may
have been accidental.434 More generally, explanations such as over-
sight, sloppiness, or accident are often used to resist the argument
426. See id. at 253-54.
427. See id. at 252-53.
428. See id. at 253.
429. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
430. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
431. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 424, at 256-57.
432. See id.
433. See id.
434. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 553-54 (2004).
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that minor changes in language result in significant legal conse-
quences.435
This criticism gains its force from the ordinary-language view of
the Constitution. Ordinary language, whether employed in spoken
speech or in written documents, is far less likely to rely on strong
inferences from minor changes in language. Such inferences even
appear rare in documents (other than legal or technical ones) that
are carefully drafted. Stringent textualism is simply not the com-
mon practice of ordinary language. By contrast, the stringent text-
ualist argument for the nature of executive power becomes stronger
if the Constitution is understood as written in the language of the
law. Then the deliberation and careful attention to technical detail
characteristic of legal language make the inferences drawn by
theorists like Ramsey and Prakash much more plausible.
The second argument claims that “the executive power” in the
Vesting Clause includes the foreign-affairs power.436 Prakash and
Ramsey implicitly rely on the language-of-the-law view here. They
do not argue based on the ordinary meaning of executive power;
instead, they look to the meaning of the term employed in various
elite discussions of the law. Prakash and Ramsey rely on Black-
stone’s Commentaries,437 probably the leading law book on English
Law at the time of the drafting of the Constitution. They also
discuss legal writings by Emer de Vattel (The Law of Nations) and
Thomas Rutherforth (Institutes of Natural Law), as well as two
other works that discuss constitutional and natural law, John
Locke’s Second Treatise and Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws.438
Prakash and Ramsey show that these elite, legal writers share an
understanding of executive power that includes the foreign-affairs
power.439 Thus, it is no surprise that Prakash and Ramsey show that
the attendees of the drafting and ratification conventions, as well as
other newspaper participants in the debates on the Constitution—
elites with knowledge of the language of the law—also understood
435. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 375, at 177; Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 434, at 625-
26.
436. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 424, at 252-53.
437. See id. at 268-69.
438. See id. at 266-70.
439. See id. at 271-72.
2018] THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 1407
the executive power to include foreign-affairs authority.440 By
contrast, the foreign-affairs power is not found in the ordinary
meaning of executive power as typically specified. For example,
Webster defines “executive” as “[t]he officer, whether king, president
or other chief magistrate, who superintends the execution of the
laws; the person who administers the government; executive power
or authority in government.”441 The most straightforward under-
standing of this definition is that “executive” includes only those
who implement the law. Under this interpretation, the foreign-
affairs authority would not be included.442
Overall, then, the success of the foreign-affairs interpretation
turns largely on the language-of-the-law view. Under that view, the
strong textualism and the legal meaning of executive power rein-
force one another to provide a persuasive account of the Executive
Power Vesting Clause. Under the ordinary-language view, by con-
trast, that interpretation is much weaker.
440. See id. at 285-88, 294-95. It might be argued that authors such as Locke and
Montesquieu were writing political theory and therefore not using the language of the law.
But this argument is mistaken. First, Locke and Montesquieu are not properly understood
as nonlegal writers. Locke wrote about the proper organization of the constitution and the
natural law. See id. at 266-68. His understanding of these matters overlapped significantly
with the constitutional law of England. Lois G. Schwoerer, Locke, Lockean Ideas, and the
Glorious Revolution, 51 J. HIST. IDEAS 531, 547-48 (1990). Indeed, because his understandings
were so influential, they worked their way into legal discussions and the law of England and
the United States. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 424, at 271-72; Schwoerer, supra,
at 547-48. Locke also influenced Blackstone. See PAUL O. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER:
MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 126 (2003). Montesquieu
also influenced legal discussion in England and America. See, e.g., id. at 126-27; Prakash &
Ramsey, supra note 424, at 271-72. Indeed, Montesquieu’s famous chapter on the separation
of powers was entitled “Of the Constitution of England.” 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF LAWS 162 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., George Bell & Sons rev. ed.
1909) (1748).
But even if one believed that Locke and Montesquieu were not speaking the language of the
law, that would not support the ordinary-language view. Locke and Montesquieu were elite
political theorists and their understanding of terms, such as executive power, might reflect
the specialized understandings of these elite political theorists. Such concepts might be as
alien to ordinary speakers as those within the language of the law.
441. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 690 (1828). 
442. Cf. id. It is possible that other dictionaries might have a different definition or that
this definition’s reference to “executive power” would have been understood as containing the
foreign-affairs power. But in the absence of such evidence, this definition suggests that the
ordinary meaning of executive power was restricted to the power to administer or superintend
the laws.
1408 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1321
C. Five Other Examples of Originalist Scholarship Relying on the
Language of the Law
We have provided two sustained examples of influential original-
ist interpretation that depend on reading the Constitution as writ-
ten in the language of the law and are inconsistent with reading the
Constitution as written in ordinary language. We now offer brief de-
scriptions of important recent scholarship that supports this same
proposition.
John Stinneford has provided a new interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment by reading the Clause in the language of the law.443 The
Eighth Amendment provides, “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted.”444 Stinneford argued that “unusual” means against “im-
memorial usage”—a common law concept.445 The use of this legal
meaning resolves any ambiguity that would exist if the term were
read in ordinary language, in which “unusual” would more likely
suggest evaluating a punishment against current norms rather than
past norms.
Stinneford also shows that the term “cruel” is ambiguous if
viewed from an ordinary language perspective, because it could
apply to cruelly disproportionate punishment or to punishment done
with cruel intent.446 He again uses the legal history of the term to
show that its legal meaning was the former.447 He also uses a legal
interpretive rule, noscitur a sociis, to argue that disproportion is the
more appropriate interpretation of cruel, given that the term ap-
pears in a clause that also bans “excessive” fines and “excessive”
bail, terms themselves that focus on disproportionate effect.448 He
shows that this interpretive rule existed at the time of enactment of
the Bill of Rights.449 Thus, his analysis not only turns on the lan-
guage of the law, but also on the use of a specific legal interpretive
443. Cf. Stinneford, supra note 35, at 1745.
444. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
445. See Stinneford, supra note 35, at 1745.
446. See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 444
(2017).
447. See id. at 473-74.
448. See id. at 471-73.
449. See id. at 472 n.181.
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rule that was applied to legal language at the time of the Clause’s
enactment.
Scholars have recently tried to discover the original meaning of
the Due Process Clause by giving the Clause its legal meaning
rather than its ordinary meaning. Like Stinneford’s reading of
“cruel and unusual punishment,” Nathan Chapman and Michael
McConnell interpret the term “due process” as placing into the
Constitution certain common law understandings.450 As a result,
they understand it as preventing the legislature from exercising
judicial power or violating common law procedural protections.451
Ryan Williams adopts a different interpretation of the Due Process
Clause, but he also embraces the legal meaning of the Clause.
Williams maintains that the Due Process Clause changed meaning
prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.452 He argues that
numerous antebellum judicial decisions abandoned an essentially
procedural understanding and interpreted the Clause in a more
substantive way.453 Those legal decisions established a new legal
meaning for the Clause.454 Indeed, it seems unlikely that the ordin-
ary meaning of due process would have changed during this period.
Scholars have also maintained that language that looks most
ordinary is better understood as part of the language of the law. The
Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.455
The word “unreasonable” is sometimes used as an example of a
vague word in ordinary language that renders the meaning of a
450. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1677 (2012).
451. See id.
452. See Williams, supra note 88, at 469-70.
453. See id. at 465-69.
454. See id. at 469.
455. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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constitutional provision indeterminate.456 But Laura Donohue has
argued that the word “unreasonable” should be instead read with
the legal meaning of “against the reason of the common law.”457 As
a result, the Fourth Amendment does not incorporate some free-
floating reasonableness test, but a set of specific prohibitions of
searches that violated the common law.458 For instance, she argues
that warrantless entry into homes except in pursuit of a fleeing
felon was a paradigmatic example of a search “against the reason of
the common law” and is therefore prohibited.459 Under this view, the
Fourth Amendment is not a provision of magnificent yet indetermi-
nate generality, but a relatively precise catalogue of prohibitions on
government action.
Other recent scholarship has suggested the language of the law
is essential to deciding who can hold the highest office in the land.
The Natural Born Citizen Clause provides, “No Person except a na-
tural born Citizen ... shall be eligible [for] the Office of President.”460
It is not clear that the term “natural born Citizen” would even
register in ordinary language. But if it could be read in ordinary
language, it would appear to require that only those born in United
States territory were eligible for the presidency. Under English law,
however, a person born outside of the country could still be a
natural born subject if he was classified as a subject under the laws
at the time of his birth.461 Thus, Michael Ramsey argues that a
natural born citizen is a person who was a citizen under the laws at
the time of his birth.462 By treating a constitutional provision as
written in the language of the law, Ramsey found its meaning in
legal history.
The language of the law is also at the heart of reevaluation of the
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.463 While an ordinary
456. Cf. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181,
1190, 1192 (2016) (demonstrating unpredictability and change in the court-interpreted
meaning of “unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment).
457. Id. at 1192-93.
458. See id.
459. Id. at 1192, 1228-29.
460. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
461. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Original Meaning of “Natural Born” 3 (Jan. 7, 2016) (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712485 [https://
perma.cc/PWG5-N2UB].
462. See id. at 3-4.
463. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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reading of the Clause may make it seem vague, a recent book argues
that its concepts have clear foundations in eighteenth-century
Anglo-American law.464 One of the authors uses fiduciary law to
conclude that the incidental powers authorized by the Clause had
to be less than the principal powers specifically authorized by the
Constitution.465 Another interesting conclusion from this analysis is
that the meaning of the Clause requires that this power be used
impartially and thus that the original Constitution applied some
form of an equality principle to the federal government.466 Whatever
the validity of this interpretation, it would be impossible to derive
such an interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the words.
Thus, as originalist scholarship has grown more sophisticated and
serious in the past decade, academics have turned to the language
of the law to understand the Constitution’s meaning. These inter-
pretations cannot be derived from ordinary meaning. This legal turn
provides more evidence that the Constitution is best understood as
written in the language of the law, not ordinary language.
CONCLUSION
Understanding the nature of the language in which the Constitu-
tion is written is the first step to accurate interpretation of our
fundamental law. The Constitution’s language plays an essential
role in constitutional interpretation. The centrality of legal interpre-
tive rules in the language of the law suggests that original-methods
originalism offers the best understanding of originalism. And the
richness of the legal idiom shows that originalism has resources to
dissolve interpretive issues that may seem unresolvable on an
ordinary-language view. Only by getting the language of a document
right can interpretation be placed on a secure foundation.
464. See Raiders of the Lost Clause: Excavating the Buried Foundations of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, in GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER
CLAUSE 1, 4-5 (2010).
465. See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, supra note 464, at 84, 89-91,
119.
466. See Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and Reasonableness, in THE
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, supra note 464, at 120, 138, 141.
